It is a pity that I can’t recount the free-wheeling, scintillating
discussions with the Russian intelligentsia and political elites through the
past four days in St. Petersburg and Moscow — because of Chatham House rules.
Anyway, I am speechless every time I come here — how much this country has
changed since I first lived and worked here in 1975.
I seldom heard a kind word about Vladimir Putin in all these 4 days so far.
Our Prime Minister Manmohan Singh should consider himself an extraordinarily
lucky man in comparison. Russians are simply reveling in the seamless freedom of
expression they currently enjoy, which, when combined with their compulsively
brooding nature and their tendency to be self-deprecatory, can inebriate the
power of reasoning at times. The “discontent of democracy”?
However, today in Moscow the Chatham House rules were mercifully lifted for
a scintillating 2-hour conversation we held — a 50-member group of “Russia
watchers” drawn from Europe and the United States, plus China, Japan, India and
Iran (including three former prime ministers and one defence minister and a top
communist party official) — today with Alexey Pushkov, chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of Russia’s State Duma (Parliament).
Pushkov is known to be close to President Vladimir Putin and is an
authoritative voice on Russian foreign policy. He is a many-splendoured
personality — professor, strategic analyst, journalist and today a politician.
In the Russian system, his current position gives him a prominent role in the
foreign policy establishment. (We hope to be received by Putin.)
Pushkov confirmed a trend which I began noticing from Day 1 as soon as I
came, namely, that notwithstanding the rhetoric from Moscow, Russia’s heart and
soul is still with the West, while the East becomes a mere occasional affair, a
highly selective engagement. Much of the angst reminds me of a jilted lover —
something we all have gone through sometime or the other in our tumultuous
life.
Actually, Pushkov devoted almost three-quarters of his talk to Russia’s
relations with the West, United States in particular.
It was left to a prominent Iranian member of parliament (who is also a
member of the Majlis’ consultative committee on foreign and security policies)
in our group to gently point out toward the end that Pushkov didn’t say anything
about the SCO or the Arab Spring — and, unsurprisingly, it was my turn to
elicit Pushkov’s views on Russia’s tryst with Asia. Out of old habit, I kept a
verbatim account, which I summarize below:
*** Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet era has always been about the
West. “But a limit has been reached for both sides.” Russia’s admission to the
two most important western institutions — NATO and EU — is not going to be
possible. Russia is unwilling to concede its sovereignty and in any case the
“returns” for doing so aren’t commensurate. There are no “incentives” for Russia
to rethink.
***Russia came close to considering membership of NATO, but it is clear
that neither side will gain out of Russia’s accession. It is a closed chapter
now.
*** As for EU, Russia has strengthened its European identity and is already
part of the European economic space. But Russia is not a part of “political
Europe” or the “military-political Europe”. Simply put, Russia has a different
political culture and there is a huge ideological difference between Russia and
the EU countries.
*** Russia’s problem is quintessentially that “there is nowhere to go
East”, either. There could possibly be an economic dimension to Russia’s ties
with the East, but “much less” is there in the East in political or military
terms. Besides, China with which Russia has close relations has a “relatively
free hand” in Asia and, therefore, Russia has settled for bilateral
relationship. Neither Russia nor China wants a military alliance to counter
NATO; at any rate, such a (Sino-Russian) alliance is neither desirable nor is
conceivable.
*** So, at the end of the day, it is all economics with the East — oil,
gas, etc.
*** Against this backdrop, a consensus has appeared in Russia that it has
no need to go anywhere, and should rather stay put where it is. Eurasia is
Russia’s “natural habitat”. Also, major military potentials are concentrated in
Eurasia: US also happens to be a Eurasian power thanks to its alliances with
countries like Pakistan or South Korea; most of the conflicts today are on the
peripheries of Eurasia, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus, Eurasia is vital
to Russia’s interests.
*** How does Russia approach Eurasia? The formation of a Eurasian Union is
the principal idea today. The Customs Union has been the first step and it is
proving efficient. A country like Kazakhstan, which knows very well where its
interests lie, wouldn’t be espousing the Customs Union without the conviction
that the grouping could be greatly beneficial.
*** The next step is going to be the Common Economic Space, which forms the
backbone of the Eurasian Union. There is a lot of skepticism in the West about
the Eurasian Union idea but it doesn’t perturb Russia. All sorts of things have
been said about the euro zone or the imminent fall of the dollar, but events
proved otherwise; so will be the case with the Eurasian Union.
*** The key factor here is that Russia should not press its partners with a
political union or common currency. “Those things can wait.” The Eurasian idea
should be approached cautiously and convincingly. A lot can be gained in the
economic field.
*** Besides, Eurasian Union “turns Russia into an independent center of
attraction for other countries.” Much depends of course on how well Russia does
economically.
*** Suffice to say, the western perception that “Russia is going toward the
East” or is seeking a confrontation with the West is unwarranted. Russian
foreign policy has been largely reactive — except, perhaps, on Syria. It is the
West which precipitated the current tensions while Russia has not sought
confrontation. The war with Georgia was provoked by the West; Russia didn’t
precipitate it.
*** The root problem is that the West wants Russia to “make it look like
the European countries”, but Russia has its own character, its ideology,
customs, etc. An ideological element is always present in the West’s — and the
US’ — attitude towards Russia, “which is dangerous”. The objective should be “a
decent cooperative relationship” rather than to make Russia “a carbon copy” of
the western countries.
*** Russia is not prescriptive toward the West. Russia didn’t ask how come
George W. Bush won in 2000 or why Ohio today is so terribly important in an
apparently nation-wide election. It is up to the US to have its political or
electoral system. But the West is needlessly intrusive and Russia cannot accept
it.
*** Post-Soviet Russia began with a clean slate. There was no desire for
another Cold War and on the contrary, Russia had a lot of warmth toward the US
in the early 1990s. But the result was disappointing; perhaps, Russia expected
too much. “Instead of becoming an ally of the US, Russia became an object of US
influence.”
*** The eastward expansion of NATO was the defining moment in the evolution
of Russia’s foreign policy ideology. Thus, the present ideology — the “ambition
to be an independent player” — was borne out of actual experience. It began in
the period of Boris Yeltsin circa 1995. The replacement of Sergei Ivanov as FM
with Evgeniy Primakov and the choice of Victor Chernomyrdin rather than Gaidar
as PM — although they were apparatchiks — it was Yeltsin’s response as a
Russian politician who began realizing that the first five years of his
presidency “didn’t give the desired results”.
*** The core problem is the misunderstanding on the part of the West that
Russia will “comply”. Indeed, “Russia has complied on many things, but not all.”
Out of this experience this ideology has been born that Russia should be an
“independent center of power”.
*** Russia is looking for a “balancing role” in Asia. It is no longer a
superpower. The Asia-Pacific is becoming “the area” of the 21st century. But it
is a hotbed of tensions. Russia fears that an “imbalance can develop” in Asia
and “Russia doesn’t want to see a single power dominating Asia.” The role of an
“efficient balancer” is what Russia can and should play in Asia. If Russia tries
to exceed that role, “there could be misunderstandings.” (This part on Asia was
in response to my intervention.)
*** With regard to the Arab Spring, Russia has a cautious approach. Russia
is opposed to revolutions; it has had enough of revolutions in its history. The
Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 was a “historic mistake”. Because of it, “Russia
was affected genetically; it was a national tragedy.” Therefore, the revolutions
in the Middle East should not be viewed from an ideological perspective. The
notion of humanitarian intervention should be definitely reconsidered. And
foreign powers “should not take moral sides in civil
conflicts.”
– October 25, 2012
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