Monday, January 30, 2012

China to make Shanghai global yuan hub by 2015...


China to make Shanghai global yuan hub by 2015....

SHANGHAI (Reuters) - China intends to establish Shanghai as the global centre for yuan trading, clearing and pricing over the next three years as part of broader plans to make the commercial hub an international financial centre by 2020.

The plan for Shanghai's financial innovations through 2015, published jointly by the country's economic planning agency and the Shanghai government on Monday, set goals on a wide range of areas aimed at further developing Shanghai, though some analysts said many of them appeared ambitious.

"This anticipated pace of development looks a bit quick to me," said Frances Cheung, a strategist at Credit Agricole in Hong Kong.

China wants to transform Shanghai into an international financial centre on par with the likes of New York and London by 2020. That goal was set in 2009 by the State Council and analysts have taken it as a broad deadline for liberalizing the currency.

The state economic planning agency, the National Development and Reform Commission, outlined a series of goals under the 2015 yuan plan.

These included making the daily yuan mid-point published by the central bank in the onshore yuan market serve as the benchmark for both domestic and foreign yuan trading markets.

Currency traders interpreted the statement partly as a message from Beijing that the yuan's movements, which have increasingly been influenced by the offshore market over the past few months, should be decided by the government.

"There have been recent developments that have put Hong Kong's offshore market in the spotlight from time to time, such as its pricing of the yuan quite differently from the onshore market," said a trader at a European bank in Shanghai.

"In this sense, the NDRC statement is published at a sensitive time and means the government once again wants to emphasize that it has the final say in the value of the yuan."

The plan also aims to make the government-backed Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (Shibor) the benchmark for yuan credit everywhere and targeting to more than double the annual non-forex financial market trading volume to 1,000 trillion yuan by 2015.

While the plan lacked details on how China would achieve these targets, analysts were skeptical on the feasibility of some of the planks in the platform.

"Shibor is not even a very well established benchmark onshore," Cheung said. Markets currently use the government's seven-day repurchase rate as the lending benchmark.

Analysts said the NDRC's plan gave no fresh insight into how quickly China would liberalize its capital account, a crucial step in Shanghai's attempt to become a global money hub.

China has taken a series of measures over the past two years to invigorate the offshore yuan market in Hong Kong as part of a longer-term plan to promote the use of the yuan overseas and make it a fully-convertible and international reserve currency along with the U.S. dollar.

Earlier this month, Britain said it was teaming up with its former colony to secure London a top spot as an offshore trading centre for the yuan.

The NDRC's plan would not threaten Hong Kong's current position as the main offshore yuan centre, analysts said.

"Promoting Shanghai as an onshore yuan centre complements Hong Kong's growing role as an offshore yuan center, and should help to strengthen the circle of onshore-offshore yuan flows underpinning the yuan trade settlement process," said Donna H J Kwok, economist at HSBC in Hong Kong.

China will also encourage overseas companies to sell yuan-denominated shares in its domestic stock markets, but the plan did not give a detailed timetable.

Authorities have been discussing launching a so-called "international board" on the Shanghai stock exchange for listing foreign companies' shares, seen as a centerpiece for the 2020 goal, but the city's mayor said this month that the time was not currently right for its launch.

Shanghai will explore M&A opportunities involving overseas stock exchanges to increase its global clout, the NDRC's plan said without elaborating....

Sunday, January 29, 2012

South Stream and the Trans-Anatolian pipeline: the end of Nabucco?


South Stream and the Trans-Anatolian pipeline: the end of Nabucco?
By Jonathan Levack

With South Stream and the Trans-Anatolian pipeline set to transport Russian and Azerbaijani gas, Turkey's solidifies its position as a regional energy transportation hub....

Turkey's energy minister was a busy man in December. Shortly after signing an agreement with Azerbaijan to construct an estimated $5 billion Trans-Anatolian natural gas pipeline, Taner Yildiz was shaking hands with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin over a deal that allows Russia to build its own South Stream pipeline under the Black Sea using Turkish territorial waters.

Both deals envision the transit of gas from countries of the former Soviet Union to Europe. In theory, these should contribute to Europe's stated goal of energy diversification and further underline Turkey's geopolitical credentials.

Indeed, it seems that Turkey is on the road to becoming a genuine energy player in the region. According to energy researcher Olgu Okumus of CERI Sciences Po in France, "these pipelines are concrete indicators that Turkey is on its way to becoming an important transit country."

The two deals could result in an estimated 70 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas entering Europe each year. But the signing of both deals brings into question the viability of Europe's pet project, Nabucco. The multibillion dollar project would bring gas from various sources to the Central European gas hub in Austria.

Many analysts have seen South Stream as a rival to Nabucco, but according to Okumus, it's the Trans-Anatolian pipeline that is Nabucco's real competitor.

"The Trans-Anatolian pipeline aims to transfer the same gas source to Europe as Nabucco," he explains.

And unlike Nabucco, Okumus told SETimes, the Trans-Anatolian pipeline will have a guaranteed gas supply.

"The most important partner in the Trans-Anatolian pipeline is SOCAR [the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan], which manages the Shah Deniz II gas field with BP. In other words, the Trans Anatolian pipeline will not have a supply problem because the region's dominant supplier is a stakeholder."

Turkey's new stance seems in stark contrast to previous support for Nabucco to bring gas from various sources right to the heart of Europe.

But according to Professor Ahmet Evin of the Istanbul Policy Centre, this is no U-turn. "Between 2002 and 2009 Turkey did not signal great support [for Nabucco] either. Turkey, particularly under current Minister Taner Yildiz, has realised Nabucco is a private sector project."

The implication is that if the private sector can't build it, why should Turkey step in? Unlike Nabucco, the benefits of the Trans-Anatolian pipeline to Turkey are clear. Of the 16 bcm of gas slated for the pipeline annually, 6 bcm will be reserved for Turkey's domestic market at potentially low prices. The surplus 10 bcm will be distributed to countries beyond the border, potentially including Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria.

As for South Stream, at first glance the benefits for Turkey may seem less obvious. The project will transit up to 60 bcm of Russian gas under the Black Sea to Bulgaria and then on to both Central and Eastern Europe annually.

Therefore, the current route envisions no gas for Turkey. However, Yildiz has been on record as saying that Turkey got concessions on existing agreements with Russia, but due to their nature, it's impossible to tell how significant these are.

According to Okumus, "because Turkey gained nothing official from South Stream, we can assume that the Minister has at least negotiated the price of the existing purchase agreements or revised the take or pay conditions."

But Evin argued that despite potential concessions, the agreement is "obviously politically motivated. Think about it as a package of deals with Russia."

Saturday, January 28, 2012

Russian Military Continue Re-armament drive....


Russian Military Continue Re-armament drive....


Russia’s Defense Ministry has released information about its weapons procurement in 2011. According to the first deputy minister Alexander Sukhorukov, the ministry has purchased 30 Topol-M (SS-27 Sickle B) and Yars ballistic missiles, 4 military satellites, 21 aircraft, 82 helicopters, one Stereguschiy class corvette, 8,531 military trucks and other military hardware. The total weapons procurement budget for 2011 amounted to 721.2 billion rubles (about $23 billion), including both federal budget money and government-guaranteed loans what was significantly more that in previous years, said the military official.

He also noted that the defense industry didn’t fulfill 84 contracts with the ministry at a total of 42 billion rubles. This includes the delayed deliveries of one Ivan Gren class large landing ship, USET-80 torpedoes, three Sukhoi Su-27SM fighters, one Su-34 bomber, two Ansat-U light training helicopters and Su-35S multirole fighters.

The
massive re-armament of the Russian armed forces will continue this year. The weapons procurement plan for 2012 was approved by the government on Dec. 23. Under it, the Ministry plans to spend 908.4 billion rubles for new weapons and military equipment. About half of this money will be spent under already signed long-term contracts, explained the deputy minister. He said that in early February the ministry expects to place a number of new large orders including contracts for delivery of Borei class nuclear submarines, S-300V4 (SA-23) long-range air defense missile systems and MiG-29K ship-based fighters....



Norway to open up Barents for exploration after border demarcation....


Norway to open up Barents for exploration after border demarcation....


The Norwegian government is to propose exploration of a new sector of the Barents Sea, after a maritime boundary there was finally agreed with Russia.

Oil Minister Ola Borten Moe has said that the new area in the south-east Barents, covering around 44,000km2, could be explored from spring 2013. The government has already started seismic assessments in the region.

The demarcation of the maritime border with Russia was formally ratified last summer. Russia and Norway had been locked in a territorial dispute over the region since 1970, when Norway argued that the boundary should be drawn at the middle point between the nearest land areas belonging to both sides. Russia used claims drawn up by Stalin (unilaterally) that proposed a 'sectoral' approach along certain meridian lines.

A moratorium on oil and gas drilling in the disputed zone was announced in 1975, and the border was demarcated in 2010 based on a compromise which divides the disputed zone into two roughly equal parts.

Exploring the Barents Sea will allow Norway to begin offsetting its dependence on its North Sea oil and gas reserves, which are steadily declining. 181 blocks in the region have been nominated by oil companies in the preliminaries for the latest exploration round, the highest ever number. Nominating companies include ExxonMobil, Shell, ConocoPhillips, Total and Statoil.

The Oil Ministry will assess the nominations and announce which blocks are an offer by the summer, with full exploration work expected to go ahead by next year...


Iran, Saudi Arabia ink deal to develop joint oilfield....


Iran, Saudi Arabia ink deal to develop joint oilfield....

Iran and Saudi Arabia have agreed to develop a gasfield which straddles their mutual maritime border, a rare positive sign amid growing military tensions in the Gulf and other disputes over divided resources.

Iranian Oil Minister Rostam Qasemi said on 6th January that Tehran and Riyadh have already signed a deal to develop the Farzad A field, which is shared between them. They are also set to sign a deal on developing the nearby Farzad B gasfield as well as the Arash oilfield. Development plans for all three fields will be released before mid-March, according to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).

The news about the Arash field is somewhat surprising: very recently, the Iranian government announced that it would begin unilaterally developing the field (which lies between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) unless Kuwait finally agreed to joint development. That announcement followed a warning by a senior Iranian MP that Arab states were 'stealing' Iranian energy reserves from disputed fields.

Jointly developing the fields is part of an Iranian strategy to increase domestic gas and oil production in the face of tightening international sanctions. Iran is also rushing ahead with production on the giant South Pars field (shared with Qatar), where NIOC is working around the clock to bring subsequent production phases onstream.

Building a healthy working relationship with the Saudis will also help to reduce tensions between them over Iran's nuclear programme and its threats to close the Strait of Hormuz in reaction to any Western or Israeli airstrike. Iran's stance has alarmed Gulf Arab states, so working together on energy production will help to reassure Riyadh that Tehran is committed to a normal relationship....
Iran has warned Kuwait that it will unilaterally proceed with full-scale drilling at the disputed Arash gas field in the Persian Gulf, if Kuwait fails to agree on joint development. The warning comes amid heightened tension in the Persian Gulf between Iran and its neighbours as well as the US.

Head of the Iranian Offshore Oil Company Mahmoud Zirakchianzadeh told state media that “if Iran's positive diplomacy is turned down, we will be carrying on our efforts at Arash field unilaterally”. There was no immediate response from Kuwait. The Iranian statement comes just two weeks after a senior Iranian MP accused Arab states of stealing oil and gas from shared fields in the Persian Gulf.

Emad Hosseini specifically referred to the Arash field in his comments, in which he accused Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of working together to exploit joint fields to Iran's cost .There are at least fifteen fields shared between Iran and its Gulf Arab neighbours, many lying close to maritime boundaries which are themselves often in dispute.

Negotiations on the Arash field have been ongoing since 2006, when Iran and Kuwait agreed in principle to jointly develop the field. In March 2010 they re-confirmed their commitment to joint development, but at the beginning of last month Tehran announced that it would begin drilling four wells at the field.

The maritime border between Iran and Kuwait remains unconfirmed, despite numerous rounds of talks between the two sides. Although essentially a technical issue, political tensions in the Gulf and the presence of joint gas fields has stymied progress on defining the border....


Germany Frets As Bailouts And Risks Balloon...


Germany Frets As Bailouts And Risks Balloon


The government’s reluctance has made Germany the favorite punching bag of the economic world, and most certainly of George Soros, who mused in Davos: "It's Germany that dictates European policy ... the trouble is that the austerity that Germany wants to impose will push Europe into a deflationary debt spiral."

But demands for more money never cease. EU Finance Commissioner Olli Rehn, also hobnobbing in Davos, stated that even the second bailout package for Greece, €130 billion, wouldn’t be enough to deal with Greece's collapsing economy and mounting pile of debt. Every few months, the amounts to bail out Greece are rising. But it’s not just Greece. Other countries are on life support as well.

And so the bailout mechanisms have become a bewildering and expanding array of direct and indirect contributions, commitments, and guarantees that, theoretically, all 17 member states of the Eurozone would share proportionately. But five of them—Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain—are in trouble. So the remaining 12 have to shoulder their burden, and some of them are teetering.

Now all eyes are on Germany. CESIfo, the Munich-based economic research group that publishes the closely-followed Ifo Business Climate index, has put a pencil to Germany’s maximum exposure over time, given today’s commitments. In addition to the bailout mechanisms, the report takes into account Germany’s exposure through its 27.1% share of the ECB and its 6% voting rights of the IMF. Total exposure: 635 billion ($831 billion), a whopping 27% of Germany’s GDP. And it doesn’t even include any bailouts within Germany. The details:

- €22 billion for the first bailout package for Greece, agreed upon in May 2010. The Eurozone would contribute €80 billion and the IMF €30 billion—to be paid out in tranches. Hiccups developed immediately. Slovakia didn't participate. Ireland and Portugal dropped out as both were put on life support. Germany's share is based on its share of the ECB (27.1%).

- €1.8 billion for Germany's share (6%) of the IMF’s €30 billion contribution to the package.

- €12 billion for the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) of €60 billion, established in May 2010—based on Germany's 20% share of the EU budget.

- €253 billion for the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), established in June 2010 and enlarged in October 2011 to €780 billion. Germany’s share is 27.1% (based on its share of the ECB), or €211 billion. Also included is the 20% increase allowed under German law.

- €15 billion for the IMF’s €250 billion commitment to the EFSF. Germany’s liability is based on its 6% voting rights of the IMF.

- €94 billion for the ECB’s purchases of sovereign bonds. The "Securities Markets Program," launched in May 2010, has grown to €219 billion. Germany’s exposure is composed of two factors: its share of the ECB (27.1%) and its portion of the share of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, which won’t be able to fulfill their commitments to pay the ECB for losses. For a total of 43%.

- €237 billion through “Target2.” Target2 and its predecessor “Target” were a mundane part of the ECB's interbank payment system. The ECB would temporarily borrow money from the central bank of one country and lend it to the central bank of another. In 2008, however, as capital flight from periphery countries began, the credit flow became one-sided and ballooned with each new outbreak of the debt crisis. Thus, these once ordinary credits became the first de facto bailout of crisis-struck countries. By November 2011, total amount in credits extended to the central banks of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy was €556 billion, according to Ifo.

Germany's share of Target2 balances is based on its share of the ECB (27.1%). Since Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy won’t be able to bear their share of any losses, the remaining 12 countries would have to bear them proportionately, giving Germany 43% in total exposure to Target2 balances.

And so Merkel's question—"How long will that remain credible?"—has become a litmus test for Eurozone bailouts. But bailouts take on a life of their own. In September 2008, Treasury Secretary “Hank” Paulson walked into the Capitol and threatened that the whole world would collapse if his demands weren’t met. Paulson's extortion worked. So, Greek prime ministers imitated him. And now Christine Lagarde, managing director at the IMF, tried it too....

Russia's Deepest Interests Are Linked to the Arctic....


Friday, January 27, 2012

The Iranian oil embargo blowback...


The Iranian oil embargo blowback...
By Pepe Escobar

If the sorry parade of European poodles - or what analyst Chris Floyd delightfully dubbed Europuppies - had any understanding of Persian culture, they would have known that blowback for their declaration of economic war in the form of an Iranian oil embargo would be nothing short of heavy metal.

Better yet; death metal. The Majlis (Iranian parliament) will discuss this Sunday, in an open section, whether to cancel right away all oil exports to any European country that approved the embargo - according to Emad Hosseini, the rapporteur of the Majlis Energy Committee. And that comes with the requisite apocalyptic warning, relayed via the Fars news agency, courtesy of member of Parliament Nasser Soudani: "Europe will burn in the fire of Iran's oil wells."

Soudani expresses the views of the whole Tehran establishment when he says that "the structure of their [Europe's] refineries is compatible with Iran's oil", and so Europeans have no alternative as replacement; the embargo "will cause an increase in oil prices, and the Europeans will be compelled to buy oil at higher prices"; that is, Europe "will be compelled to buy Iran's oil indirectly and through intermediaries".

According to the EU sanctions package, all existing contracts will be respected only until July 1 - and no new contracts are allowed. Now imagine if this pre-emptive Iranian legislation is voted within the next few days. Crisis-hit Club Med countries such as Spain and especially Italy and Greece will be dealt a deathblow, having no time to find a possible alternative to Iran's light, high-quality crude.

Saudi Arabia - whatever the oily spin in Western corporate media - does not have the spare capacity; and on top of it, the absolute priority for the House of Saud is high oil prices, so it can bribe - apart from repressing - its own population into forgetting about noxious Arab Spring ideas.

So yes, already broken European economies would be forced to keep buying Iranian oil, but now from the winners of choice - middlemen vultures.

Not surprisingly, the losers lost in these Cold War tactics anachronistically applied to a global open market are the Europeans themselves. Greece - already facing the abyss - has been buying heavily discounted oil from Iran. The strong possibility remains of the oil embargo precipitating a Greek government bond default - and even a catastrophic cascade effect in the eurozone (Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain - and beyond).

The world needs a digital Herodotus to decode how these European poodles who claim to represent "civilization" were able, in a single stroke, to inflict simultaneous pain on Greece - the cradle of Western civilization itself - and Persia - one of the most sophisticated civilizations in history. In an astonishing historical replay of tragedy as farce, it's as if Greeks and Persians were bonded together at the Thermopylae facing the onslaught of North Atlantic Treaty Organization armies.

Hit the Eurasian groove
Now compare it with the action all across Eurasia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, "Unilateral sanctions don't help matters". The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, exercising immense tact, nevertheless was unmistakable; "To blindly pressure and impose sanctions on Iran are not constructive approaches."

Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said, "We have very good relations with Iran, and we are putting much effort into renewing Iran's talks with the 5+1 [Iran Six - the United Nations Security Council permanent members plus Germany] mediators' group. Turkey will continue looking for a peaceful solution to the issue.”

BRICS member India - alongside Russia and China - also dismissed sanctions. India will keep buying Iranian oil and paying in rupees or gold. South Korea and Japan will inevitably extract exemptions from the Barack Obama administration.

All across Eurasia trade is fast moving away from the US dollar. The Asian Dollar Exclusion Zone, crucially, also means that Asia is slowly disengaging itself from Western banks.

The movement may be led by China - but it's irreversibly transnational. Once again, follow the money. BRICS members China and Brazil started bypassing the US dollar on trade in 2007. BRICS members Russia and China did the same in 2010. Japan and China - the top two Asian giants - did the same only last month.

Only last week, Saudi Arabia and China rolled out a project for a giant oil refinery in the Red Sea. And India more or less secretly is deciding to pay for Iranian oil in gold - even bypassing the current middleman, a Turkish bank.

Asia wants a new international system - and it's working for it. Inevitable long-term consequences; the US dollar - and, crucially, the petrodollar - slowly drifting into irrelevance. "Too Big to Fail" may turn out to be not a categorical imperative, but an epitaph.



Thursday, January 26, 2012

Southern gas corridor grows more complex...


Southern gas corridor grows more complex...
Robert M Cutler

MONTREAL - Just as smaller gas projects in the European Union were welcoming a decision by Azerbaijan and Turkey to build a Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TAGP), statements now coming out of Baku to the effect that Azerbaijan may be able to fill the larger Nabucco pipeline without the need of Turkmen gas - contrary to previous plans - have complicated the supply picture for southern Europe.

Design details remain to be clarified for the TAGP, which will run from Turkey's eastern to its western border and is also referred to as "Trans-Anadolu" and sometimes by its acronym in Turkish, TANAP, but it is planned to take 16 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of natural gas, of which 6 bcm/y would be for domestic Turkish consumption. The Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) projects are both scaled to transport about 10 bcm/y, whereas the projected volume of the Nabucco pipeline has always been 31 bcm/y. If one does the math, then it is clear that this would leave 10 bcm/y for either ITGI or TAP.

ITGI, TAP, and Nabucco all submitted final bids to Azerbaijan for gas from the second-phase development of the offshore Shah Deniz natural gas deposit at the beginning of October, 2011. At the last minute, BP submitted a draft of an idea (the South-East European Pipeline, SEEP) that is not a fleshed-out proposal but which closely resembles the subsequently-announced TAGP project. It was then announced that decision originally due before the end of the year would be postponed until the end of March at the latest.

The various projects are continuing their publicity campaigns to position for winning the upper hand, or at least survival. Nabucco representatives have declared their willingness to work with the TAGP project, whose sponsors declare that its volume could indeed be scaled up, even though one of its selling points is that it uses long segments of existing pipeline that would require further capital investment to be expanded. However, Nabucco has suggested that “additional guarantees” might be necessary in order that natural gas from Turkmenistan, through a long-discussed Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) under the sea to Azerbaijan, might be included.

The guarantees would come from the eventual operators of the TAGP, which at present is the operational responsibility of Azerbaijani and Turkish government-run companies the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) and BOTAS of Turkey, although the companies have said that they are willing to include others. Under the agreement entered into by the neighbors, SOCAR will build the pipeline with BOTAS and TPAO, another Turkish state firm.

Until recently, gas from Turkmenistan was considered necessary for ramping up the quantities to Nabucco’s 31 bcm/y planned capacity, particularly in view of Azerbaijan’s repeated declaration that it was not prepared to supply more than 10 bcm/y from Shah Deniz Two, in order to maintain its ''security of demand'' (having many customers means not being beholden to any single one). Now comes the suggestion from unofficial circles in Baku that in the longer run, Azerbaijan might be able to supply gas for Nabucco by itself, without the need for Turkmenistan to get involved.

In the past few years, discoveries of further deposits in Azerbaijan's Caspian Sea offshore have increased the country's export potential to the point where Baku’s assertion of an ability to export 31 bcm/y through a version of Nabucco becomes credible, if one supposes that gas from deposits other than Shah Deniz Two will feed it.

The problem from the standpoint of Nabucco’s proponents, however, is that that then requires extending the project's time-frame into the somewhat indefinite future, since those other offshore natural gas fields are not yet even close to entering production. Clearly, this is not the same Nabucco that the European Council endorsed at its Prague Summit in 2009 and for which a Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement (NIA) was laboriously negotiated.

Indeed, the creation of the TAGP project effectively makes it possible for Turkey to transit Azerbaijani gas to Europe without being bound by the rules of the NIA, which it signed and ratified. As spokeswoman for the European Commission Marlene Holzner told Reuters this week, the fact that “Turkey is only an observer of the European [Energy] Community ... means that it does not have to implement EU energy law.” (The European Energy Community extends the EU’s internal energy market to a number of EU non-members Southeastern Europe.) Holzner nevertheless expressed the hope that an intergovernmental agreement would be created “for any pipeline” that would reflect “certain principles.”

As for the smaller SGC projects, it is to be noted that the Norwegian firm StatOil holds a 42.5% stake in TAP as well as a 25.9% share in the consortium developing Azerbaijan’s offshore Shah Deniz deposit, although this is no guarantee of the TAP's eventual success. Azerbaijan will remain the owner of the 10 bcm/y that will transit the TAGP to Europe, and it is just not clear that there will be sufficient demand for it in Italy, where TAP makes eventual landfall.

On the other hand, an Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria is under completion that could take half of the 10 bcm/y in the first instance, which could conceivably be doubled. And Azerbaijan is known to have a distinct sympathy for the smaller countries in Southeastern Europe that especially suffered from Russia's mid-winter cutoffs of natural gas to Europe via Ukraine during the last decade....


Wednesday, January 25, 2012

South Stream Becoming a Reality, Nabucco Down but Not Out....


South Stream Becoming a Reality, Nabucco Down but Not Out....


On December 29, 2011, Turkey and Russia signed an agreement to allow the South Stream natural gas pipeline to transit the Black Sea waters in Turkey's economic zone. This was an important development, in that South Stream now has the necessary permissions to bring the Russian pipeline system to Europe via the Southern corridor. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was so excited by the development that he ordered Gazprom to move up the date to begin construction from 2013 to 2012.
There has been much speculation that the pipeline is a bluff--designed to either stop Nabucco construction or to force Ukraine to bend to Moscow's will. The truth may be more obscure. US Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Richard Morningstar commented in a
recent speech, "The Russians have...taken to building the South Stream Pipeline, although they are the only ones who know why."
The fact is that, regardless of what the original thoughts may have been concerning the pipeline, Russia has made so many commitments concerning this pipeline that it would be almost impossible for them to back out. There are three Western European private companies who are partners in this project. It is extremely doubtful that Germany's Wintershall (a division of BASF), Italy's ENI, and France's EDF would incur start-up expenses in support of a Russian political ruse. Gazprom still controls 50% of the consortium and could unilaterally kill the project, but it would incur the wrath of its other partners.
The same goes for the various governments that have signed on. Bulgaria has hired a company for a feasibility study, Slovenia has created a JV to build and operate their share of the pipeline, Serbia looks forward to being a key transit center, Greece (now to be on a spur instead of the main line) has identified the pipeline as a national priority, etc.
Much has been made that South Stream has not identified where it will get the 63 bcm annually it needs to fill the pipeline. In fact, South Stream never planned to identify new sources of gas, but to use the gas that is presently transiting the Ukrainian pipeline system, according to South Stream CEO Marcel Kramer.
European Energy Review published an interview with Kramer on this subject. "The basic and overriding target of Russia is to ensure the technical, managerial and economic reliability of its gas supply. That is where South Stream comes in. Don't forget that the pipeline system in Ukraine is in a poor state. It's being said that it is old, dilapidated, without an integrated management system. To upgrade the entire route through Ukraine would also cost a lost of money. Then you get into questions of ownership, operatorship, who puts up the money, the chances of political interference. The bottom line is, is this an arrangement that the buyers of gas in Europe can rely on? If you put all this together, the answer is clear," he said.
Ukraine, of course, is opposed to the new pipeline. Energy Minister Yuri Boiko called South Stream a threat to Ukrainian national interests. "We will always be against it," he said according to
UPI.
Another question has been whether there is sufficient demand for Russian natural gas to justify the building of the pipeline. Andrea Bonzanni, former consultant to the UN and the World Bank, wrote in
World Politics Review that the mid- to long-term outlook for gas demand does not seem to justify the construction of both Nabucco and South Stream.
The Russians believe Europe has a long-term need for additional gas, justifying the construction. After a meeting between Gazprom Chairman Alexi Miller and Bulgargaz executive director Dimitar Gogov,
UPI reported the participants issued a statement that both sides "share the opinion that given the inevitable gas demand growth in Europe, timely implementation of South Stream would meet the interests of millions of European consumers." Miller has said, "It is clear that there will be need for additional pipeline capacities" that would help mitigate risks that could have a serious impact on the European market, according to Platts. Alexander Medvedev, deputy chair of the Gazprom Management Committee, wrote in Today's Zaman, "The fact that South Stream is primarily an investment in energy security, not in boosting the market share of Russian gas, also means that it does not compete with other pipeline projects that intend to import fresh supply volumes from other possible gas sources. South Stream does not oppose these projects." RIA Novosti quoted Gazprom's Medvedev, "Even if we take into account the Nord Stream, the South Stream, the Nabucco and liquefied natural gas, all the same, the shortage of gas supplies to Europe will be some 530-700 billion cubic feet."
Some within the European Union appear to agree with this analysis. European Energy Commission Gunther Oettinger
said "we don't want to block South Stream," and arranged for South Stream executives to make their case to the commission in May. At that meeting, the Russians took the opportunity to make the case that South Stream is a continuation of Russian trans-border pipelines, and third parties should not have access to it. Ths would guarantee a Gazprom monopoly on the project flow. CEO Kramer said requiring the pipeline to open to competitors would affect the project's rate of return, and could make the project more "difficult" to carry out, according to the New York Times. Oettinger, however, remained adamant: "If South Stream...gives access to gas independents active in Russia, then South Stream would deliver on two essential criteria: namely diversification of routes and counterparties. That means a stronger contribution to European diversification efforts," he said in a speech reported by the Wall Street Journal.
Whether the doubters or the believers are correct, however, it appears that the construction of the pipeline will begin within the next twelve months.
It's been a tough six months for Nabucco, the European Union-preferred route that is supposed to bring Caspian natural gas to Austria via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. Azerbaijan has received bids for its Shah Deniz II oil from several competing consortiums, and several of them are more attractive economically. On top of that, Nabucco still is unable to find enough feedstock for its pipeline. Despite these setbacks, some analysts believe the route remains the most viable route: because it guarantees independence from Russian natural gas, and because it can carry more product than any of the competition (except for South Stream).
On June 8, the Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH signed project support agreements with the transit countries, but Azerbaijan did not sign the agreement as this would have signaled their choice of a route. Elshad Nasirov, vice present of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), said that Azerbaijan was not prepared to commit all its gas to one buyer. "We prefer diversity among the buyers, so we sell gas to the EU and Iran, as well as Russia,"
Hurriyet reported him as saying. Nasirov cast doubt on Turkish support of Nabucco, citing Turkish failure to provide Azerbaijan with a signed copy of the project support agreement, and failure to sign a bilateral transit agreement. "If we have not yet signed the transit agreement, should we understand that Nabucco has still not been sanctioned byTurkey?" he asked. In a foreshadowing of Azeri support for the Trans-Anatolian pipeline proposal, he told the Wall Street Journal that he preferred a smaller pipeline that could be expanded later to meet additional capacity. He also said that SOCAR would consider becoming a shareholder in this smaller pipeline, in order to influence transit tariffs and other decisions.
Contradicting Nasirov was Azerbaijan's Minister of Industry and Energy Natiq Aliyev.
UPI reported him as saying his country supported the Nabucco project. "As part of this project, Azerbaijan can serve as a transit country, as well as a gas supplier, as the project is seen as a priority in light of the diversification of gas supplies," he said. UPI reported the German energy company RWE, whose support had been questioned after they signed a purchase agreement with Gazprom, remained committed to Nabucco, according to RWE Chief Executive Officer Joergen Grossman. In addition, Bayerngas announced its desire to join the Nabucco consortium, according to the Dow Jones newswire.
Nabucco submitted its formal proposal to SOCAR at the end of September, along with all its rivals. SOCAR spokesmen announced at various times that a final decision would be made as early as October 2011or as late as 2014.
Nabucco's inability to find gas supplies has forced it to delay by 3 years its scheduled date to begin operations. Orignally scheduled to be completed in 2015, completion date is now scheduled for 2018--although construction is still supposed to begin in 2013, according to the CEO of OMV Gerhard Roiss the
Sofia News Agency. To solve this problem, Austria's President Heinz Fischer asked Turkmenistan to become a Nabucco supplier, according to Associated Press. According to Dr. Friedemann Muller of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, the Turkmenistan gas is crucial for Nabucco to be successful. (The issue of bringing Turkmenistan gas to Azerbaijan via the Trans Caspian Pipeline is addressed in numerous other entries on this blog.)
The cost of Nabucco has also become an issue. Hungarian National Development Minister
Tamas Fellegi complained, "No one can predict the final cost of Nabucco, but according to optimistic estimates, its cost may reach 24-26 billion euro," a far cry from the original projection of $8 billion. The European Commission believes the price will be closer to $10 billion, and Nabucco chief Reinhard Mitschek does not believe financing will be an issue. "I am confident that once we will have the gas supply and transportation contracts and...with political support we expect financing will be settled and will not create a bottleneck," quoted Reuters.
U.S. Special Envoy Richard Morningstar has never been a Nabucco supporter, and he has continued to denigrate its possibilities. At a news conference in Baku, he said that Nabucco retained U.S. political backing but that economic concerns should take precedence. "It's important if Shah Deniz producers and SOCAR choose a smaller pipeline as the first pipeline," he said according to
Reuters.
Nabucco's primacy was challenged in December 2011, when SOCAR and the Turkish Pipeline Company (BOTAS) announced their plan to build their own pipeline, the Trans Anatolian pipeline. According to SOCAR president Sabit Bagirov, however, this development actually helps Nabucco's prospects: "With the implementation of the Trans Anadolu Dogalgaz Pipeline, the necessity to construct the Turkish section of Nabucco will disappear, and the builder will only need the gas pipeline section from Turkey through Bulgaria to the distribution point in Baumgarten in Austria. In other words, with the implementation of the Trans Anadolu Dogalgaz Pipeline, only that section of the Nabucco route falling on European teritory will need to be built," quoted the
Moscow Times.
As 2012 begins, Nabucco appears no closer to completion than it did at the beginning of 2011. Construction is scheduled to begin on time, but completion will not be until 2018. The consortium relies on Shah Deniz II gas, which SOCAR wants to pump through the Trans Anatolian Pipeline. On the other hand, Nabucco could join this new project. The price continues to rise, and no alternative feedstock sources have been found. Nabucco is not dead, but it might be considered to be on life support....