Monday, March 22, 2010

A Greek Endgame?

http://www.appropriate-economics.org/ebooks/neo/neo2.htm

http://seekingalpha.com/article/195481-sovereign-lies-why-euro-is-destined-to-collapse

The crisis that started in Greece has given birth to a new crisis of the eurozone as a whole. There is no doubt that the major responsibility rests with the Greek authorities who mismanaged their economy and then deceived everyone about the true nature of their budgetary problems. The financial markets and the eurozone authorities, however, also bear part of the responsibility for letting the crisis degenerate into a systemic crisis of the eurozone....

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/opinion/25kaplan.html

© 2010 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)

Download:


Thursday, March 18, 2010

Hidden Money, Covert Operations

Banknotes from various countries, courtesy of Roby72/flickr


Legal European trust practices allow multinationals to hide finances and operate covertly, Jody Ray Bennett writes for ISN Security Watch.

By Jody Ray Bennett

In 1995, then-US President Bill Clinton signed an executive order prohibiting American companies from doing business in Iran. When the decision was made to extend Washington’s unilateral economic sanctions against Tehran, multinational companies bemoaned the move and criticized the policy, claiming that American businesses would be punished for Iran’s actions.

Speaking before the CATO Institute in 1998 as the CEO of Halliburton, Dick Cheney complained about the company’s inability to penetrate the Iranian market: “[This] has to do with efforts to develop the resources of the former Soviet Union in the Caspian Sea area. It is a region rich in oil and gas. Unfortunately, Iran is sitting right in the middle of the area and the [US] has declared […] sanctions against that country. […] Iran is not punished by this decision. There are numerous oil and gas development companies from other countries that are now aggressively pursuing opportunities to develop those resources. That development will proceed, but it will happen without American participation.”

Just a few years after Cheney’s statement, Halliburton was under investigation for doing business in Iran through one of its subsidiaries registered in the Cayman Islands, a well known tax haven utilized by businesses to hide and protect profits offshore. More recently, Halliburton’s ties to Iran were shown to involve more than just an offshore letterbox business with no employees that exploits a loophole in the US sanction policy that “allow[s] foreign subsidiaries of foreign companies to work in Iran as long as they [are] completely independent of their parent in America.”

How was Halliburton able to do business in Iran through a completely independent company with no ties to its headquarters in the US?

The process occurs through a little known practice in European trust law called Hidden Treuhand, which “submits to legal local customs in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg and Switzerland, but due to globalization, has moved beyond European borders via corporations and individuals, who put it to personal use.”

In a new book titled Hidden Treuhand: How Corporations and Individuals Hide Assets and Money, author Shelley Stark details the history of the Hidden Treuhand, how it operates, who it benefits and its implications for the global economy.

How Treuhand works

In Austria, the legal code §1002 defines a Treuhand contract as a contract coupled with a power of attorney, where someone - usually a lawyer referred to as a Treuhänder - conducts business duties in his name. According to Stark, the relationship begins with a non-public agreement between one party (referred to as a ‘Giver’) who transfers profits or assets to another (‘Taker’).

“The Giver appoints the Taker to be his direct representative in the inner relationship and controls the Taker’s actions as regards the asset with the ‘secret power of attorney.’ This inner relationship is only described in the documentation between the Taker and Giver and is created separately so that no legal relationship between the Taker and Giver can be proven. Thus, a Taker’s function as a trustee morphs into the property owner and his function as the Giver’s lawyer is hidden by virtue of the ‘secret power or attorney’,” Stark told ISN Security Watch.

“The Hidden Treuhand can exist without any public record and concluded by any two people capable of being party to a contract. It is a civil contract not regulated by law, but is based on the general principal that one has the right to make contracts as one pleases. It gives the appearance that an asset belongs to another. The true beneficiary’s identity is not publicly apparent, nor is it outwardly recognizable an asset is in a Treuhand. Thus, any kind of asset: corporate shares, financial instruments such as derivatives, stock, and bonds, bank accounts, hedge funds, real estate, even an offshore subsidiary of a publically traded company can be owned completely in secret,” said Stark.

According to Stark’s research, it is virtually impossible to apply law to a contract or business situation that is not transparent.

“Lawyers are often called upon to act as a ‘trustee’ in a hidden ‘Treuhand’. But there is no law regulating hidden Treuhand, only laws specifying that the lawyer cannot divulge any secrets pertaining to the client,” Stark said.

Stark explained how it all works: A notary public notarizes the names of all shareholders and registers them in the public corporate register. Anybody wishing not to be evident in this public registry engages a lawyer to represent his shares or ownership. Anonymity is insured because only the lawyer’s name will be notarized and visible in the corporate registry. The true beneficiary’s name is not notarized or publically evidenced in any form. The private contract, known as a hidden Treuhand, documents the arrangement between the lawyer and client, and only they are privy to its contents.

“Despite the secretiveness, there are nonetheless quite a few examples of hidden Treuhands causing severe concern,” Stark said, noting the case of the Bawag bank in Austria and hidden losses of €1.4 billion through Treuhands established in Liechtenstein, the Refco case, which became the 14th largest bankruptcy in America, and the UBS bank vs US attorney generals. “Germany is deeply embattled with regards to Treuhand banks accounts in Liechtenstein siphoning off millions in taxable income from Germany,” Stark added.

Security implications

As the practice is completely legal, Halliburton was able to establish a shell company in Austria called Halliburton International GmbH that contains no employees and generates no income. Because 51 percent or more is controlled by a Taker (secretly controlled by a Giver), Halliburton was able to circumvent international sanctions and conduct business in Iran legally.

“All that is needed for a US company to be completely independent of the parent company in America is to have 51 percent of the company owned by a foreigner, or someone without American citizenship. With a Hidden Treuhand embedded in the corporate structure, a Taker, who is a foreigner, can hold the 51 percent on behalf of the company. With little effort, any company could slip under that radar,” Stark said.

Thus, profits generated from these ventures cannot publicly be traced back to Halliburton’s American headquarters.

“Halliburton uses it subsidiaries in Europe, especially Austria, to move funds without transparency and also profits from the few regulations in the accounting standards. Its Austrian subsidiary receives all income from other subsidiaries (in Russia and Kazakhstan, for example), zeros out the book value, loses the paper work, and the these firms disappear from records, ostensibly hidden in other Treuhands,” Stark explained.

A recent New York Times investigative story discovered that more than $100 billion was awarded to multinational corporations for contracts while conducting business in Iran - $15 billion of which went to companies that “defied American sanctions law by making large investments that helped Iran develop its vast oil and gas reserves.”

The issue of the hidden Treuhand raises concerns about companies that are financially powerful enough to penetrate a global market and supply sensitive infrastructure, private security and intelligence for international clientele. That large financial institutions can affect or alter state-to-state relations speaks volumes about the cult of deregulation, a core feature of present day globalization.

While Stark maintains that Halliburton is just one of many large multinationals that makes use of Treuhand practices, the use of Treuhands - not only by mammoth defense contractors - raises serious questions over corporate accountability for both taxpayers and shareholders. But the implications for national security becomes even more dire, as Hidden Treuhand contracts can enable large, private companies to directly interfere and affect interstate relations. Stark recently wrote about how hidden Treuhands have the ability to fund organized crime, money laundering operations or covertly finance terrorist groups.

“The impact of hidden Treuhands for International Relations and Security is enormous. Foreign policy decisions can be rendered moot when a foreigner owns 51 percent of the subsidiary. This fortuitous loophole allows a US subsidiary to effectually not be subject to US foreign policy decisions and speaks volumes for how ineffectual sanctions really are,” Stark said.

Wednesday, March 17, 2010

Betting the farm on oil


Betting the farm on oil

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf

http://www.energybulletin.net/node/52068

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/oil_quench.html

By Hossein Askari and Noureddine Krichene

In March 2009, when oil prices were at US$45 per barrel, if a speculator had made a bet that oil prices would rise by March 2010, he would have made a tidy gain of 82% as prices are now around $82 per barrel. But if a conservative retiree, who could not assume any risk, had invested his money in US government notes over the same period, he would have made 0.23%.

What a difference! Go back further in time. If in 2002, when oil prices were at $19 a barrel, a speculator had bet that oil prices would keep on moving up to $80 a barrel by 2006, he would have earned a tidy return of 43% per year compared with an annual return of 1.5% on US Treasury notes. If in August 2007, when oil prices were at $71 a barrel, a speculator had bet that oil prices would accelerate to $147 a barrel in July 2008, he would have earned a whopping 117% per year, compared with 1.2% per year on US Treasuries.

Now, today in March 2010, if our speculator bets that oil prices will move up from the prevailing $82 per barrel to $100 per barrel, or a higher, in the near future, his bet would be consistent with observed trends. Let’s explain.

In the past decade, oil and other commodity price inflation have shattered records. Oil price inflation averaged 43% per year and commodity price inflation averaged 28% during 2002-2008, dwarfing commodity price inflation of the 1970-1981 period, a record for modern times with oil prices rising at 26% a year and commodity price inflation at 10% a year.

Why has the period 2002-2008 been so inflationary for commodities? Central banks, notably the US Federal Reserve and European Central Bank (ECB), have categorically denied any link between their monetary policies and oil and commodity price inflation during this period. Instead, they have blamed it on rapidly growing Chinese and Indian demand for oil and other commodities and on constrained supplies on the part of producers. Academics and the media have generally supported this view. The impact of expansionary monetary policy by the Fed during 2002-2005 and the impact of widening US fiscal deficits on oil and commodity markets have been simply ignored.

Despite a rejection by central banks of a link between commodity price inflation, record low interest rates and massive liquidity injection, a number of observers in the distant past, ever since the quantity theory of money, as well as contemporaneous analysts see monetary policy as a plausible explanation for sustained commodity price inflation. General price inflation could be plausibly explained as a monetary phenomenon. The monetary explanation for commodity price inflation lumps cost-push and demand-pull theories of inflation together as transmission mechanisms for monetary shocks and deals only with the accommodative or restrictive stance of monetary policy in fueling or retarding a general price increase.

The more monetary policy is accommodative, the more powerful would be the inflationary effect of monetary accommodation. Consequently, the present stance of near-zero interest rates and unlimited money injection by reserve currency central banks can only feed further commodity price inflation and a general rise in prices. The longer this stance is maintained, the faster the acceleration of inflation and the more predictable the rise of oil prices. In this unorthodox monetary policy setting, a forecast of oil prices going to $100 a barrel, or persistently moving higher, in the near future can only be a sound forecast.

In late 2008, equity and commodity prices crashed. Oil prices fell from $147 per barrel to a low of $32 per barrel in December 2009. Those who all along maintained that China and India were the cause of oil and commodity price inflation must have been embarrassed by this crash. Surely, they could no longer defend their view that China and India were the key determinant of oil and commodity price inflation.

If rapidly increasing demand from China and India was behind the explosion in oil and commodity prices, a student of economics would have had to infer that demand from China and India had crashed, or possibly supply had exploded. But this is not supported by the facts. Despite a fall in oil prices by 82% in less than four months, oil output and oil demand remained stable at 86 million barrels per day (mbd) during September-December 2008.

Similarly, the acceleration of oil prices from $71 per barrel from August 2007 to $147 per barrel in July 2008 would have made the same student think that oil demand had increased dramatically or oil supply had fallen dramatically. Neither event took place nor realistically could they have. Oil demand and supply remained stable at 86 mbd during August 2007-July 2008.

Are demand and supply models that economist use faulty? Certainly not. To answer the apparent puzzle, a student should be introduced to paper barrels, as opposed to oil in real barrels, traded in organized futures exchanges around the world that artificially increased the demand and supply for oil and to the role of speculation supported by the liquidity provided by central banks. The crash in oil prices in late 2008 was due to over supply of paper barrels in a stampede to sell long positions at a time when hardly anyone wanted to buy futures contracts when oil futures prices were collapsing; whereas the acceleration of oil inflation during August 2007-July 2008 was due to over demand for long positions when oil prices were confidently rising on the strength of abundant financial liquidity and low interest rates.

Organized futures markets were initially established for hedging as genuine commodity producers, such as wheat farmers, wanted to protect themselves against declines in prices and genuine consumers of commodities, such as bakers, wanted protection against a rise in prices. Nonetheless, futures markets have become dominated by speculation. Speculators are interested in profits from short-term changes in commodity and equity prices. Traders in oil futures could be commercial traders, non-commercial traders, or others. Non-commercial traders could include banks, hedge funds, commodity funds, pension funds, and a number of other institutions; brokers could trade for their own account.

Non-commercial trade may account for 60% to 80% of traded futures contracts. A seller of an oil futures contract does not need to be Exxon, British Petroleum, Shell, or any other oil company. A hedge fund that buys oil futures contracts would become a seller of a futures contract when it closes a position to reap gains or prevent losses from its futures contracts. In fact, futures contracts are settled in offset cash settlement and very rarely through actual delivery of commodities.

Why were oil prices stable during 1983-2000 at about $18-$20 per barrel? Does it mean that there were no speculators in the market during that time? Or similarly, why did the New York Exchange not crash during 1920-1929? Were there no speculators during that time? Speculators are always operating in the market.

During 1983-2000, interest rates were relatively high, liquidity was scarce, and government bond yields were high in the range of 6%-8% per year, making bonds more attractive and less risky than commodities. Speculation flourishes when interest rates are exceptionally low and liquidity plentiful. When interest rates are very low and liquidity is abundant, the cost of margins becomes very low. That is, speculators can borrow from their brokers at very low interest rates as they did prior to the stock market crash in 1929, and price trends become unmistakenly upward moving.

It is cheap liquidity that fuels speculation. When central banks generously provide very cheap liquidity, speculation is fired up. The speed at which equity, commodity, and asset prices rise would depend on the speculative euphoria and the real economic activity. Buoyant real activity would accelerate the speed at which speculative prices rise. Nonetheless, a drop in real activity would not necessarily preclude a rapid rise in prices when interest rates are very low and liquidity abundant. For instance, oil prices rose from $32 per barrel in December 2008 to $82 per barrel in March 2010 even though oil demand declined from 86 mbd in December 2008 to 85 mbd in March 2010. In 2009, major banks posted large profits from trading in commodities and equities in spite of a sluggish economy and rising unemployment.

The intensity of speculation also varies depending on the specifics of the commodity market in question. Even though all commodity markets are under a common speculative trend that could be rising as observed during 2002-2008, stationary as during 1983-2000, or crashing as in the last quarter of 2008, the intensity of speculation depends on the characteristics of each market.

For instance, a recent drop in sugar supply sent sugar prices skyrocketing by 160% from $295 per ton in December 2008 to $767 per ton in January 2010, with powerful inflationary effect on sugar-based products. Oil markets have characteristics that are different from agricultural commodities. More specifically, oil output has very low variability in the short-run and is almost fixed; similarly, oil demand is highly inelastic and cannot change in the short-run. These characteristics rule out short-term changes in real oil demand and supply and bring oil prices under stronger inflationary pressure compared to many other commodities. As for any commodity, speculative increases in oil prices are instantaneously transmitted to consumers. Oil price inflation continues to weigh on economic activity and contributes to a general rise in energy costs until it becomes disruptive as it did during 2007-2008 or during the 1970s.

Commodity markets rapidly transmit the inflationary effects of US Fed and other major reserve currency central banks monetary policies. Commodity prices are very sensitive to interest rates and availability of liquidity through borrowing. Cheap money policies have operated through a number of channels, including credit channel, exchange rate channel, and commodity channel. The commodity markets channel operates faster in comparison to other channels with instantaneous impact on consumer prices. For instance, while US banks are at present awash with $1.175 trillion in excess reserves, which they could not lend profitably and with reduced risk, futures markets have been on a speculative rise as illustrated by large rebounds in gold, oil, food, and many other commodity prices. At present, bonds are offering very low yields and would suffer large price losses if interest rates started rising; whereas commodities are offering a significantly higher and safer return under prevailing unorthodox monetary policy environment.

Who is in a position to determine whether oil prices move to $100 per barrel, $147 per barrel, or even higher? It is not the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, China or India. It is not even the speculators. Speculators are simply microstructures that are risk-averse and seek to profit from opportunities for gains; they were not able to prevent a sharp decline in oil prices from $41 per barrel in 1981 to $8 per barrel in 1986, nor were they able to push oil prices beyond $18-$22 per barrel during 1985-2000.

The late Milton Friedman stated that there was inflation only because the US Fed had decreed so. By setting interest rates near zero bound, the US Fed as well as other reserve currency central bankers are igniting oil price inflation. By creating fictitious liquidity, that is, liquidity that has no real counterpart, major central banks are providing the fuel for speculation and for driving oil prices to $100 per barrel and higher.

In fact, extremely low interest rates and fictitious liquidity created by US Fed and other reserve currency central banks pushed credit to excessively high levels that resulted in a meltdown of subprime credit. Not only did private sectors become over-indebted, governments also availed themselves of very cheap credit. The financial crises in Iceland and Greece have demonstrated the distortive and disruptive effects of excessively expansionary policies. Most disturbing, European leaders have yet to grasp the underlying cause of the crisis they face and the unsustainability of excessive public debt. Recently, European leaders have expressed anger against speculative attacks and credit default swaps (CDSs) for causing the financial crisis in Greece and making the financing of Greek debt more expensive. Likewise, the US Congress blamed oil companies and oil producers for the oil crisis in 2007-2008. If one were to believe the logic of European leaders, if CDSs are banned, Greece and other European countries could borrow more cheaply and the debt crisis would be resolved. Simple logic indeed.

Fictitious money creation by reserve currency central banks was conducive to high oil and commodity price inflation. Since the US Fed could not push oil output above 85 mbd nor could it prevent a sharp drop in sugar output, its fictitious money creation has amounted to a real redistribution of purchasing power in favor of borrowers and speculators and imposed a heavy tax on workers, pensioners, and other fixed-income groups - and a cut in real incomes for millions of consumers around the world. By paying threefold to fourfold more for basic commodities, consumers are cutting dramatically their real consumption of these goods and at the same are being taxed directly through commodity price inflation by central banks.

Today, major central banks may have become a powerful destabilizing force. If US banks had deployed the excess liquidity ($1.75 trillion) created by the US Fed, they would have triggered the worst commodity price inflation. Would economic recovery become sustainable and companies go on a hiring spree when oil prices are back up to the $147 per barrel mark? If you are the US Fed or the ECB and believe that commodity price inflation is irrelevant, then economic growth would be strong regardless whether oil prices exceed $147 per barrel or hit newer records. However, if you remember the 1970s and 2007-2008 with high oil and other commodity prices, then you would realize that persistent increases in oil prices could become disruptive and could dissuade hiring and undermine economic growth. It would appear that the world economy may be locked in a vicious circle of loose monetary policy and spiraling oil and commodity price inflation.

Hossein Askari is professor of international business and international affairs at George Washington University. Noureddine Krichene is an economist with a PhD from UCLA.

Peak OIL...

The peak oil concept started as a Royal Dutch Shell IO and PsyOps campaign. The concept was introduced by M. King Hubbert, the chief consultant for general geology for Shell in a paper he presented at the American Petroleum Institute in 1956. Mr. Hubbert's paper was actually a pitch that the energy industry should rapidly start moving to nuclear. What wasn't mentioned was that his employer had just made massive acquisitions of uranium resources. The peak oil concept is based on his research, which when graphically displayed is referred to as Hubbert's Peak. While it is true that we should be working hard to transition off of fossil fuels for a combination of technological security, national security, economic security, and climate security reasons, and that we will one day run out (so other than the fact that we don't ever do anything until its a crisis and we can't control the costs, so why wait?) we really don't have any good idea when we'll hit the point where there is no more petroleum reserves to be discovered or even exactly how much we've got left to extract. The link to Hubbert's report is below:


Iran-Pakistan pipeline inches nearer reality


Iran-Pakistan pipeline inches nearer reality
By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/us-objects-to-gas-pipeline-deal-with-iran-240

http://rupeenews.com/2010/03/28/beijings-2-5-to-extend-iran-pakistan-pipeline-to-china/

http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/ipi-the-baloch-perspective-230

India now plans to buy gas from Iran via deep-sea

KARACHI - Islamabad and Tehran have signed an operational agreement on the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline project, a month after the signing was delayed because Pakistan was unable to arrange funds for the project.

The countries signed a "heads of agreement" and certain "condition precedents" to make the gas sales purchase agreement (GSPA) signed last June effective. The signing of these agreements was required for the flow of Iranian gas towards Pakistan to begin in three to four years.

The pipeline as initially mooted was to carry gas from Iran to Pakistan and on to India. India withdrew from negotiations last year over disagreements on price and transit fees, but it is still open for the country to joint the agreement.

The United States, Pakistan's largest aid donor, is reluctant to help Islamabad proceed with the multi-billion dollar pipeline because of the participation of Iran, perceived in Washington as seeking to build nuclear weapons. Some analysts believe that financial sanctions on Iran may delay but not force the cancellation of the pipeline, as China is also keen to join the project. Beijing may provide financial assistance to Islamabad to get the project started.

Under the GSPA, Iran will provide 750 million cubic feet of gas per day to Pakistan for the next 25 years. Initially, an offshore pipeline was proposed, but the present plan is for an overland route from the South Pars fields in southern Iran.

Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and his Iranian counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, signed a US$7.5 billion agreement in Tehran last May, finalizing the deal to transfer gas from Iran to Pakistan. Iran will initially send 30 million cubic meters of gas per day to Pakistan, to be increased to 60 million cubic meters per day.

Each country will be responsible for building the section of pipeline that runs through its own territory. The Pakistan government had been unable to allocate proper financing and the US is not willing to give financial assistance in this regard, DawnNews reported, citing sources from Pakistan's Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources.

The US has previously pledged all-out support in ensuring energy security for Pakistan, which suffers long and frequent blackouts amid an electricity shortfall of more than 3,000 megawatts. US companies, such as Carlyle Group affiliate 4Gas, Oklahoma-based Walters Co, and Global Edison, plan various energy-related projects in the country.

Critics say that the US interest in resolving Pakistan's energy crisis is an attempt to foil the Iran pipeline project.

Beijing is interested in building a pipeline from Iran via Pakistan into China to secure an overland energy corridor less liable to interruption by US or other forces at times of international tension while also cutting out the 20,000 kilometer tanker route around the southern rim of Asia. Critics say that by opposing the IP project, the US is also trying remove this option for China.

China at present appears to be the sole country holding out against sanctions against Iran over its nuclear policy of the five veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council (the others are United States, Russia, Britain and France). The need for Iranian oil and gas is making it difficult for Beijing to agree with Washington on its stance against Tehran, according to a report in Dawn last month. Approving sanctions against Iran would mean the loss of 10% to 12% of China's oil imports and of hundreds of billions of dollars worth of oil locked into futures contracts, while also ending about $80 billion in Beijing-backed development projects in Iran. If China joins the project, the pipeline would pass through Pakistan's Northern Areas, now known as Gilgit-Baltistan, and into China via the Khunjerab Pass. The pipeline would roughly parallel strategic transport links China is developing between its remote western regions, including Xinjiang, and Gilgit-Baltistan.


India today said it has proposed trilateral talks in May with Iran and Pakistan on the multi-billion dollar gas pipeline to address its security and other concerns, two days after Tehran and Islamabad went ahead with a bilateral deal for the project.

"... As far as India is concerned, we are in consultation with the government of Iran. We have certain concerns. Concerns about pricing, concerns about security, which have been taken up with the government of Iran,"
External Affairs Minister S M Krishna said here.

Pakistan on Tuesday signed a USD 7.5 billion deal with oil-rich Iran, paving the way for laying the much-delayed natural gas pipeline that was originally envisaged to extend up to India. However, it was not clear whether the deal was about Gas Sales and Purchase Agreement that allows gas sale at agreed terms and without which no transaction can take place.

"We have genuine issues that need to be addressed before we sign up for the (Iran-Pakistan-India) pipeline. We have proposed dates in May for technical level talks in Tehran to iron these out,"
Oil Secretary S Sundareshan told PTI here.

New Delhi has been boycotting project talks since 2008 after its concerns of safe delivery of gas were ignored. It wants Iran to be responsible for uninterrupted supply of gas through the 1,035-km pipeline length in Pakistan and would pay for the fuel only when it is delivered at Pakistan-India border.

Iran, on the other hand has suggested a trilateral mechanism, meaning contractual provisions between three countries, to ensure safe delivery of gas to India. Under this system, New Delhi pays for its share of gas even if the supplies were to be disrupted in Pakistan, officials said.

Officials said Tehran has been insisting that ownership of gas would be transfered at Iran-Pakistan border while New Delhi wants it to be Pakistan-India border thereby making Iran explicitly responsible for safe delivery of gas.

Noting that India was currently not part of the deal, Pakistan Petroleum and Natural Resources Minister Syed Naveed Qamar, in a statement in Islamabad, has said the heads of agreement dealt with transporting gas meant for India through Pakistani territory if and when India decided to join the project.

India has been apprehensive towards the project as the pipeline will pass through the volatile region of Balochistan and the surge in militancy in Pakistan has only increased India's security concerns about the pipeline....

.....

Knowledgeable Pakistani sources have reported China’s interest in investing $2.5 billion in the Iran-Pakistan pipeline.


Iran and Pakistan are hoping that Chinese interest and investment will spur much-delayed progress on the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline, originally planned as the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI or “Peace”) pipeline. China's possible involvement in the pipeline became critical after India appeared to back out of the project in 2009, since gas sales to Pakistan alone would not suffice to make the pipeline profitable for Iran. Although China has said little publicly about the pipeline, Iran and Pakistan can use reports of Chinese interest to pressure India into rejoining the project. New Delhi, in turn, will have to balance US pressure to abandon the project with Iran, against India’s growing domestic energy needs.

The "Peace" Pipeline

  • The $7.5 billion project is designed to supply natural gas from Iran’s portion of the South Pars gas field to the energy-hungry Pakistani and Indian markets. Pakistan is already facing an energy crisis which is expected to grow worse in the next few years.
  • The IPI pipeline would run 2,775 kilometers (approximately 1,724 miles) from the Iranian port of Assalouyeh on the Persian Gulf, through Khuzdar (with a branch to Karachi) and Multan in Pakistan, to New Delhi.
  • When completed it would supply 60 million cubic meters of gas per day to Pakistan, and 90 million cubic meters of gas daily to India.
  • Tehran and Islamabad’s negotiations with New Delhi over the pipeline stalled over India’s concerns about security along the pipeline’s route, which traverses Pakistan’s volatile Baluchestan region; price and payment disputes with Tehran; the potential for domestic instability in both Iran and Pakistan; and US pressure on New Delhi to withdraw from the project.
  • The United States is backing an alternative pipeline to India: the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) or Trans-Afghanistan (TAP) pipeline, which would circumvent Iran altogether. Development of the Trans-Afghanistan pipeline project, however, has been hampered by the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan.

China and the IPI: Risks and Rewards

As with other segments of Iran’s energy sector, Iran is hoping that Chinese interest in the IPI pipeline will offset the geopolitical difficulties which have stymied Iranian oil and gas development. Iran’s Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, even announced in February that China was ready to join the IPI. Mottaki’s announcement notwithstanding, Beijing has given no indication that it is ready to sign on to the pipeline. China may in fact be “feigning interest” in the IPI pipeline to negotiate better terms with Russia on “safer” Siberia-China pipelines.

For China, the IPI pipeline carries just as many risks as rewards. By joining the pipeline project, China can continue to diversify its energy sources, strengthen Sino-Pakistani relations, and add to its so-called “string of pearls”—comprising a line of Chinese "geopolitical influence or military presence" extending from Southeast Asia to the Middle East. On the other hand, in addition to the political and security concerns attached to the project, adding China to the IPI would entail extending the pipeline by more than 1,000 kilometers over complex and difficult terrain. This, in turn, raises serious doubts about the feasibility and profitability of Chinese involvement.

Playing Cards: Using the Sino-Indian Rivalry to Pressure New Delhi

Iran and Pakistan are using reports of Chinese interest in IPI—whether real or imagined—to pressure India into rejoining the IPI negotiations. And there are indications that this tactic may be working. In March, a month after Mottaki’s statement about China, Iranian and Pakistani officials met in Turkey to sign an agreement on the pipeline, indicating their determination to move forward with the project with or without Indian participation. A couple of days later, New Delhi, which had withdrawn from the pipeline deal in September 2009, called on Tehran and Islamabad to meet in May for trilateral talks about the IPI. It is unclear whether India intends to rejoin the project in earnest, or would merely like to keep its options open. US pressure on New Delhi to abandon the project can be expected to grow should the May discussions make progress.



Not So Steady As She Goes

A man walks past a video display showing financial information in  Tokyo, courtesy of artemuestra, Flickr.
Creative Commons Creative Commons

Tokyo stock index,

The US stock markets have recently notched over a dozen consecutive days of upward movement. There is, however, no cause for complacency,

By Robert M Cutler

In the 2007-2008 financial crisis period, volatility in equity markets worldwide spiked, driven by the US implosion. Since then, tolerance for risk has increased as the appearance of the end of the recession has taken hold.

This began with the Chinese markets, which, during much of last year, were the magnet for ‘hot money’ seeking risk and high reward. In response to Beijing’s fiscal policies, the country’s economy recovered from the US contagion and drove optimism on the international exchanges generally.

But then came the risk of overheating. In early January, however, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), in concert with the country’s other financial regulatory agencies, implemented a series of rules in order to restrain bank lending in the country, because they were afraid that domestic ‘hot money’ would overheat the economy.

Two weeks later, the PBoC’s monetary policy bureau and other agencies took the extraordinary step of ordering a large number of major state banks temporarily to cease all lending. The Shanghai stock exchange indexes have since faltered. The ‘hot money’ began to look for other places, such as Japan and South Korea, and volatility in the Asian markets increased.

Nevertheless, as Robert Prechter, founder and president of the independent financial forecasting firm Elliott Wave International, explained to ISN Security watch, “volatility [also] tends to increase [even more] when markets fall,” because “fear is a more intense emotion than hope, and this qualitative difference shows up in volatility variance.”

US recovery skating on thin ice

A big problem with the present US market is its low volume, which betrays a lack of conviction in the direction of the move. Also, the investment firm Comstock Partners notes, for example, that the benchmark Standard and Poor’s 500 index rose 62 percent in the six-and-a-half months following March 2009, but only 4 percent since then.

Bloomberg News reports that shares in the S&P 500 now trade at the average historical level of 15 times estimated earnings. However, as the Wall Street Journal observes, different valuation methods for calculating this ratio yield results ranging from 14.5 to 20. Judging whether US stocks are correctly overvalued or not depends partly on the choice of method.

Much of the debate over the near-term future of the US economy has been couched in terms of alternative scenarios known as the ‘V-shaped’ recovery (where economic growth turns positive again without an intervening period of stagnation), the ‘U-shaped’ recovery (where there is such a period of stagnation), and the ‘W-shaped’ recovery (also known as the ‘double-dip,’ where there is another decline following the current partial recovery.

The US market seems still to be pricing in a ‘V’ expectation, but the general economy’s thin ice would not appear to justify this. Three examples will suffice: Forty percent of the unemployed have been unemployed for over six months (a record level); nearly 30 percent of US manufacturing capacity is idle; and over 5 million mortgagees are beyond on their payments. But the markets seem to act as if these problems have disappeared.

Still, just two months ago, the canonical volatility index for US markets (VIX, from the Chicago Board Options Exchange) spiked 32 percent in three days in response to a series of concatenated events that fuelled economic uncertainty.

As much as it may appear that fear breeds fear, Prechter contends that “volatility in stock markets is not causing such crises as concern over sovereign Greek debt or the fall in US residential housing prices.” On other hand, “as bear markets spread across asset classes around the globe, volatility increases concurrently.

An explosive synergy

And yet there may be worse on the horizon.

In January, US President Barack Obama proposed taking $30 billion of the money repaid by big banks under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) assistance plan and providing it to smaller community banks, which would then be expected to lend it to small businesses in order to preserve and create jobs. But there is a problem here.

Following on the first wave of home mortgage failures there is a second wave approaching, affecting regions not previously touched by the crisis - and this is in addition to new problems with commercial real estate. The question then is whether these banks will lend the money that they may get from Washington, or hoard it in order to buffer their balance sheets against possible defaults.

If US banks do not lend and if jobs are not created, US consumers will be unable to drive demand for Asian goods as they have historically done in the recent past. Chinese policy has attempted to take up this slack by creating domestic demand, but there will come a time when this is no longer possible because the domestic result will be counterproductive.

The Chinese authorities recently proclaimed their projection that the country’s growth rate would once again rise to the 8 percent level this year, which is generally estimated to be the figure necessary to create enough new jobs to prevent unemployment (and the consequent threat of social unrest) from increasing.

And there are even signs that Beijing has taken President Obama’s conciliatory manner as a sign of weakness, in the tradition of mutual miscalculations between the two sides in the past. China’s monetary and fiscal policy makers will not respond to US overtures to improve the US economy but rather to fears of social unrest in their own country. The resulting disconnect between the two sides would not bode well for onlookers around the world.


Robert M Cutler is a senior research fellow at the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University in Canada.

Monday, March 15, 2010

Russia rejects calls to merge South Stream, Nabucco gas pipelines



http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=18129

Russia is not considering a proposal to combine part of its South Stream gas project with the Western-backed Nabucco pipeline, Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko said on Monday.

"We are not discussing such issues," Shmatko said. Shmatko commented on a recent suggestion by Italy's Eni SpA, Gazprom's partner in the South Stream gas pipeline project, that combining some sections of the pipelines would cut costs and boost profits.

Eni CEO Paolo Scaroni was reported to say at a Cambridge Energy Research Associates conference in Houston on Wednesday that if all the partners decided to merge the two pipelines for part of the route, "we would reduce investments, operational costs and increase overall returns."

Shmatko also said Russia welcomed Europe's desire to diversify gas supply routes but did not consider the South Stream and Nabucco as rival projects.

Both South Stream and Western-backed Nabucco aim to supply natural gas to Southern and Central Europe. The South Stream project is designed to deliver up to 63 billion cubic meters of Central Asian and Russian natural gas under the Black Sea while Nabucco is intended to pump 31 billion cu m of natural gas from the Caspian region via Turkey.

Russian experts, however, are skeptical about the prospects of merging the two pipelines as Nabucco was originally designed to cut Europe's dependence on Russian natural gas deliveries.

Sunday, March 14, 2010

World Oil Trade: New Oil Axis

http://www.eia.doe.gov/conference/2009/session3/Sweetnam.pdf

http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6337

http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Background.html

http://www.mmnews.de/index.php/Englisch-News/HOW-MUCH-OIL-IS-LEFT.html

[SEE: Unocal and the Afghanistan pipeline]

We have got used to worrying about which volatile region our energy supplies come from. Now change is afoot, new worries for different people. The world oil trade is moving from west to east, with demand growing in a region with few supplies. New balances are developing which will shape the oil market and change its geopolitics. Asia's oil will largely come from the Middle East, an area on which it has little expertise. Atlantic countries need to look to Russia and Central Asia.

The rise of Asia in the world economy is not a new phenomenon. This growth has been reflected in energy and oil demand, while oil production in the region has grown more slowly, supplying less than a third of consumption by 2008. Since 1995 the Asia-Pacific oil deficit - the shortfall of production over consumption - has exceeded that of the rest of the world outside the exporting countries of Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East: the Atlantic region on the map ....

The shift of the oil deficits to the east is massive and clear. By 2030 the Asia-Pacific oil deficit will be seven times that of the Atlantic, where demand will grow more slowly, even without the Copenhagen climate change targets. Production will increase in the deep Atlantic and, controversially, from the heavy oil and tar sands in Canada and Venezuela. By 2030 the Asia-Pacific deficit will be around seventy percent of consumption, compared to ten percent in the Atlantic.

Map that matters

To understand the eastward tilt it is helpful to look at the world in the broad geographical and logistic regions rather than the usual presentations of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD. In this map, the Atlantic and Asia-Pacific regions are structurally and permanently in oil deficit, while the Middle East and Russia-Eurasia regions are - at least to 2030 - in structural surplus.

Broadly speaking, the Atlantic region is the basis of the world oil market: private sector companies are responsible for most imports and probably about half the exports. There is an active, free oil trade between countries in the region, open to all, with a unified price structure based on the commodity markets in London and New York. In the Atlantic region the market offers the security of diversity.

The Asia-Pacific region is rather different. Although it is a quantity leader, Asia is a pricefollower. Imports to China, Indonesia and India are mainly in the hands of state-owned or state controlled companies, Middle East export contracts - from the small number of national oil companies - normally prohibit reselling.

There is not enough 'free oil' to support a liquid commodity exchange and a competitive Asian benchmark price. In this imperfect market, prices have typically been benchmarked on those in the Atlantic commodity market, at a premium above the amount paid by Atlantic importers.

Deficits are matched with surpluses through trade. There is trade between countries within these broad regions as well as between surplus and deficit regions; the total volume of trade is roughly double the big regional imbalances. There is also cross trade between the Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific. Trade ensures that prices in the two regions are closely connected.

There are striking contrasts between the dependence of the various regions in 2008. The table below shows clearly that even today:

  • The Atlantic region is far more self-sufficient than the Asia-Pacific.
  • Half of Atlantic imports are from other countries in the region, which includes north and West Africa: the integrity of this market is important.
  • The Asia-Pacific region's oil supply depends far more on the Middle East than the Atlantic region's does.

Tipping point

In 2008, seventy percent of Middle East oil was actually exported to the Asia-Pacific, while only thirty percent came to the Atlantic, whose share has steadily shrunk. By around 2015, there will be an entirely new situation - a tipping point - because the structural deficit of the Asia-Pacific will outgrow the surplus of the Middle East. By 2030 a quarter of the Asia-Pacific deficit will be met from outside the Middle East - essentially from west Africa - with some supplies from eastern Russia and Central Asia.

Apart from cross-trading, the Atlantic deficits will no longer depend on Middle East surpluses, but on the surpluses of Russia and Central Asia. This shift will have consequences which are being anticipated in strategic geopolitical and commercial developments today.

Oil may lose markets to gas. The Asia-Pacific region may consume more gas than the conservative projection of ten to twelve percent of energy demand, similar to today's, and less than half the share achieved and projected for the United States and the European Union.

However, without an increase in the gas share of the Asia-Pacific energy market, the gas deficits in the Asia-Pacific could continue to be matched by surpluses in the Middle East; a different story from that for oil. There are and will be connections between the markets through the liquefied natural gas trade and the pipeline being built from Turkmenistan to China, so prices should not move too far apart for too long.

The eastern oil markets, however imperfect, will remain connected to the Atlantic by 'pivot zones' where exporters - or importers - can choose between west and east. Whether state or private sector, they are unlikely to choose to sell - or buy - outside the competitive alternative for long. It helps that private sector companies are important in the pivot zone and that there is already infrastructure to keep options open: eastward export pipelines from Central Asia and east Siberia, export pipelines from Iraq to the Mediterranean, and the open seas of the south Atlantic and the sea of Okhotsk.

Investment in these pivot zones has a commercial strategic value: companies will compete for the most valuable permanent options, and seek support from governments interested in the security given by the diversity and flexibility of the world oil market.

Geopolitics

Finally, there are geopolitical questions. As the Atlantic dependence on the Middle East disappears, the fear of a major physical disruption of supplies also disappears: the Asian-Pacific market would absorb the first shock, though prices everywhere would be affected.

The idea - already unrealistic - of Islamic countries using an 'oil weapon' against western states implicated in the Israel-Palestine question would be off the agenda. Those trapped in the Middle East maze need to review their options. The Middle East's Asian customers need not worry: their governments have no history in the complex origins of Middle East conflicts, and no immediate role in their resolution.

The Middle East will always be important in the oil trade, but its influence will cascade through its interdependence with the Asia-Pacific region. Atlantic importers need to focus attention on the interests of Russia, Central Asia, and Atlantic Africa, where global oil markets, and oil security, will balance in future.

Friday, March 12, 2010

Medvedev plays down power role


Medvedev plays down power role

By Pavel K Baev

On his return from a trip to Paris last week, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev held a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who supervises the energy sector, and expressed satisfaction about world oil prices, which are expected to stay above US$80 per barrel.

Not that Medvedev needed that information, which is just a wishful estimate, but he obviously wanted to show that he could summon one of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's closest minions and make him say "Yes, Mr President. We will do this without fail." Russia's feeble economic recovery remains so dependent on petro-revenues that it is imperative for Medvedev to demonstrate that he is keeping the oil and gas industries under control.

Addressing French business leaders, Medvedev ventured a proposition that "economic growth fueled by commodities exports, if it has not already exhausted its potential, is no longer so relevant for us whatever the case today". He maintains the emphasis on "modernization", but this course is floundering because even the stubbornly optimistic Anatoly Chubais, who now manages the Rosnano high-tech corporation, cannot mobilize sufficient investment power.

Some adventurous Western money has returned to take its chances on the Russian stock exchange, yet the outflow of direct foreign investments continues. This trend could only be reversed if the Russian energy sector begins to generate massive profits again, though such a perspective remains in the "too-good-to-be-true" category.

The oil industry is actually performing above expectations, but Gazprom, the country's gas monopoly, faces serious problems and has not - despite a cold winter - restored its pre-crisis levels of production. The company has finally admitted that its position on the pivotal European market is weakening while it renegotiates long-term deals with its key counterparts, relaxing the "take-or-pay" condition and accepting spot-market prices for a part of the contracted volumes.

Germany's E.ON was the first company to receive this preferential treatment, but now every consumer is demanding better terms. The inevitable result of this uncharacteristic flexibility is a fall in profits, while the Finance Ministry (supported by Sechin) demands more taxes from Gazprom.

Reluctantly, making one concession after another, Gazprom's management finds itself in the unfamiliar and uncomfortable territory of a "buyers' market", where its long-cherished principle of "security of supply" becomes nonsensical.

Any other energy giant in such a crunch would have concentrated on investing in core assets and cutting down on operational costs; Gazprom is doing exactly the opposite. An investment decision on the off-shore Shtokman project has been postponed indefinitely, the work on developing the flagship Yamal project on the Bovanenkovskoe gas field faces delays, yet the luxurious "Millerhof" palace outside Moscow, linked by some Russian newspapers to Gazprom chief executive officer Alexei Miller, has been decorated. What makes this self-destructive business strategy possible is the significant increase in prices for domestic customers, who are now paying more than US consumers for gas, but this trend cannot be sustained.

The key issue that Gazprom faces now, however, is not Shtokman or energy efficiency, but the Ukrainian dilemma. Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine's newly elected president, is keen to normalize relations with Russia, which for him means first of all to renegotiate the deal that resolved the gas crisis of January 2009 and secure a significant cut in gas prices, because his budget deficit is too deep, even by Greek standards.

Paying a visit to Moscow last week, Yanukovych was eager to make every possible reconciliatory gesture, but the only trump card he could play was control over Ukraine's gas infrastructure. Selling the proposition for organizing an international consortium with Gazprom's participation would not be easy, particularly with Yulia Timoshenko leading the opposition camp, but it does make solid economic sense.

What constitutes the second horn of this dilemma for Gazprom is that the modernization of Ukraine's gas infrastructure would make the South Stream project redundant, because all the additional volumes that Southern Europe needs could be delivered without constructing a hugely expensive pipeline across the Black Sea.

Gazprom is committed to the Nord Stream project in the Baltic Sea, which will inevitably require more funding than currently budgeted, so canceling the hugely expensive South Stream might help to balance its books. The problem is that Putin continues to negotiate arrangements with potential partners, most recently Croatia, as if the South Stream is a done deal.

Medvedev, with his eight years of experience as the chairman of Gazprom's board, may understand the internal intrigues in this leviathan company even better than Putin, and he knows who benefits from the deeply corrupt business of pipeline construction. He has to make sure that the decision to cancel the South Stream mega-project is his victory shared with Yanukovych and the European Union partners, who could find it opportune to postpone the Nabucco enterprise planned to take gas from the Caspian to Europe while bypassing Russia. Any disagreement with Putin is certain to be sharp, but insightful oligarchs now find it possible to mention casually that the prime minister has incomplete and distorted information.

Putin is certainly a grandmaster of bureaucratic infighting, but he may take his position of power too much for granted. His recent demand to increase pensions by 6.5% was too populist even for veteran Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, who duly - and in vain - pointed out the deepening red ink in the federal budget. Public support for Putin's paternalist rent-distribution model remains strong, and the understanding that petro-prosperity is over will emerge only slowly, despite Medvedev's efforts at mobilizing elite groups to become stake-holders in modernization.

The only issue that makes Putin nervous is the "Yukos versus Russia" case that finally opened last week in the European Court of Human Rights, in which the now-defunct oil company is claiming US$98 billion in damages against the Russian government. Unlike the openly farcical process against former Yukos boss Mikhail Khodorkovsky and associate Platon Lebedev in Moscow, the international proceedings could put Putin on the spot, and he knows that he might be personally incriminated.

Medvedev needs a series of strong moves in the not-great but still crucial energy game, however, he has to time it precisely.

Thursday, March 11, 2010

Locks turn in Nabucco door


Locks turn in Nabucco door
By Robert M Cutler

MONTREAL - Statements by Azerbaijani and Turkish diplomats indicate that the two sides have reached an agreement in principle concerning the price that Turkey will pay for gas from the offshore Shah Deniz deposit for its own domestic consumption.

With these signals, the two countries are on the road to settling issues related to conditions for Shah Deniz gas to transit Turkey to Europe through the Nabucco pipeline.

Turkey's Grand National Assembly, the country's parliament, has approved legislation representing the ratification of the Nabucco project's multilateral intergovernmental agreement. This legislation spells out crucial details concerning taxation and transit, necessary preconditions for establishing the stable and

predictable business environment required for parties involved to seek international financing.

These had been up in the air since last May, when Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin appeared to convince his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan to backtrack on agreements that Erdogan had reached with the European Union at the Prague Summit a week beforehand. This legislation resolved exactly these questions. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank have already begun talks with the Nabucco consortium, and the World Bank's International Finance Corporation looks like being not far behind.

As reported in Zaman, Turkey's energy and natural resources minister, Taner Yildiz, told the country's parliament that a transportation fee will be imposed although no "entrance fee" would be charged for gas to come into Turkey. Ankara will impose a transit tax of 61%, contrasting this with what he said was the 16.6% transit fee that other countries (members of the European Energy Community) will impose together and divide among themselves. In addition, he said, the state-owned Turkish Pipeline Corporation BOTAS will charge a separate operating fee.

Given that Turkey will pay between US$260 and $300 per thousand cubic feet (tcm) for gas for domestic consumption from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz Two field, it seems clear that all the major actors concerned will be relying on gas from Turkmenistan as well as from Azerbaijan for Nabucco.

Even so, corporate members of the Nabucco consortium are now openly naming gas deposits in Azerbaijan's offshore sector of the Caspian Sea, other than Shah Deniz, where further proven gas reserves may be developed for transport to Europe. Azerbaijan's president, Ilham Aliev, announced nearly two years ago an estimate of 5 trillion cubic meters of reserves (including strikes in the Apsheron, Babek, Nakhichevan, Umit and Zafar-Mashal blocks.)

On the Turkmenistan front, significant movement has occurred. A bilateral business forum will be held next month in Ashgabat between Turkmen authorities and representatives of the government of Austria, whose "national champion", OMV, is operator of the Nabucco project. The issues of how to get gas from Turkmenistan into Nabucco and the conditions for this are likely to be central issues under discussion.

Concrete negotiations have already started between German gas company RWE and the Turkmen authorities in this respect. RWE is now driving discussions between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan on coming to terms over bilateral gas contracts.

The amount publicly cited of 10 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) for the amount of Turkmen gas supplying Nabucco in the first instance follows through to the letter on a Memorandum of Understanding signed in Ashgabat in early 2008 by Turkmenistan's president Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov and the EU's external relations commissioner at the time, Benita Ferrero-Waldner.

When this amount is added to the 8 bcm/y already definitely committed by Azerbaijan from Shah Deniz Two plus the 8 bcm/y contracted last year by Turkey from Iraq, the 31 bcm/y design capacity of the Nabucco pipeline looks like being filled sooner rather than later.

This fast track reveals the declarations by various representatives of rival pipelines that Nabucco's requirements could not be satisfied without gas from Iran as smoke, mirrors and misdirection.

How provision of Turkmen gas to Europe will be accelerated in the first place was indicated during a November 2007 visit to Brussels by Berdymukhamedov - that is, interconnection of gas rigs in Turkmenistan's sector of the Caspian Sea to rigs in Azerbaijan's sector, which are already part of the developing Caspian-to-Europe pipeline networks.

This way of proceeding does not require immediate resolution of the question of delimiting the Turkmenistani and Azerbaijani sectors of Caspian Sea subsoil resources: nor is that an absolutely necessary condition for the two countries to cooperate, even on joint development of the resources.

Perhaps the clearest signal that Nabucco is fast becoming a reality is the statement two days ago in Houston by Paolo Scaroni, chief executive officer of Eni, the Italian company that is an equal partner with Russian gas monopoly Gazprom in South Stream, a proposed pipeline running from Russia under the Black Sea to Bulgaria and on into Europe.

Nabucco and South Stream should combine in order to cut costs, Scaroni said. This wholly new idea comes on the heels of, and contradicts, a month-long Russian initiative in public diplomacy in the region which seeks to portray the Nabucco and South Stream projects as both being capable of realization but does not even hint at their combination into a single mega-project.

Even their routes do not by and large coincide. The South Stream pipeline would bifurcate in Bulgaria, one fork heading through Serbia to Austria and the other to Italy via Greece. The Nabucco pipeline runs through Turkey to Austria through Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary.

The South Stream project as now planned would cost twice as much to build as the Nabucco pipeline; it also broadly lacks the legal and business framework for proceeding in the manner that the Turkish parliament's ratification of the Nabucco intergovernmental agreement now provides for Nabucco. Perhaps most telling, however, the South Stream project has not yet even completed a feasibility study.

What is much more likely is that the European Commission will continue to implement its Southern Corridor energy strategy, decided at the May 2009 Prague Summit, to include not only the Nabucco but also the White Stream project. This would take gas from the Caspian Sea basin through Azerbaijan and Georgia, under the Black Sea to Romania (crossing the existing Blue Stream pipeline from Russian to Turkey) and onward to the south and/or west.

The White Stream project has moved ahead of South Stream due to the completion of a series of EU-funded feasibility studies.

In one variant, White Stream gas would enter the Hungarian network for transit across Slovakia to be consumed in Poland and Lithuania. This route would calm disquiet in these new EU members over the possibility that the Russo-German Nord Stream project under the Baltic Sea (instead of through Ukraine and Belarus) would leave them without provisions.

White Stream is projected to open with an initial capacity of 8 bcm/y, which Azerbaijan can supply by itself, rising to 24-32 bcm/y when connected to Central Asian sources (see Reconfiguring Nabucco, Asia Times Online, January 28, 2010). Even larger quantities can be provided later.

Saturday, February 27, 2010

Wall street GREED cannot and should not lead

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article25144.htm

Many parts of the economy of the USA are falling apart, or getting retarded. It is as if the economy was not an activity worth having anymore...

http://onlinejournal.com/artman/publish/article_5797.shtml

http://www.shadowstats.com/article/hyperinflation-2010

Even Lawrence Summers, President Obama’s chief economic adviser, an admirer and perpetuator of plutocracy, recognized that 75 percent of the public schools have structural deficiencies and 25 percent have problems with their ventilation systems. Dozens of thousands of bridges are falling apart, and the number of those decaying is growing faster than the number of those getting repaired. Even Russia is building high speed electric rail, and China claims to build 47 such lines, but the USA is not working on a single one. What is going on?

Video (11 min): Goldman Sucks

A small power elite has grabbed the debate, and imposed its conceptology, and its axis is maximizing financial profit, independently of any other considerations. Unfortunately for humankind, that financial world is derivative, not primary. It is a convention, not a realization. Thus make belief has replaced what really is. The real infrastructure is disintegrating, precisely because the derivative rules, and, as all mathematicians know, integration is the inverse operation from differentiation. http://reactor-core.org/grunch-of-giants.html

This is not a silly play on words and concepts: the mathematical analogy here goes all the way; letting financial derivatives rule is basically a gigantic mathematical mistake civilization has been making, in great part because those who decided, or let decide in their name, a bunch of lawyers without calculus background, such as Bill Clinton, were cognitively incapable of understanding the most basic mathematics in play.

To have made financial profit the guiding principle of civilization is, of course, deeply absurd: the fox was made guardian of the hens.

Finance was given extravagant powers in the last two centuries, powers that it did not have in the 4,000 years of civilization before that, and for very good reasons.

This abdication of power made finance the real power behind the throne, worldwide.

As Baron Nathan Rothschild (yes, from the Rothschild family) put it: "I care not what puppet is placed on the throne of England to rule the Empire, …The man that controls Britain’s money supply controls the British Empire. And I control the money supply."

Puppet. That is Rothschild’s word, not mine. It is also reality. A reality that explains the main diversion of most available capital towards the system set-up by Goldman Sachs and the like in the last 90 years, and, in particular, reinforced in the last 13 months.

Indeed, unbelievably for those not in the know, this is the exact same system that brought fascism to Italy, Germany, Spain after World War One, and made Britain, France, and the USA into close calls themselves.

The same system of thought, and actually some of the other same institutions were tender nannies for nascent Nazism (Nazism being just the most outrageous example, outrageous not just because it happened that way, and the horrendous toll, but because the instigating institutional system was capable to successfully cover its tracks. Of the people behind the Nazi scene, only Hjalmar Schacht, a "Lord Of Finance" was put on trial, and promptly acquitted in 1946. But Schacht, directly, and his ilk, more generally, made it so that Hitler got his job).

There are extremely extensive regulations in most economic domains, worldwide, but not so much in finance, although finance is the overall money creating and money allocating system.

Finance created Hitler, even the Soviets. Lenin used to joke that the "capitalists would even sell him the rope to hang them with"; at least one American plutocrat, Averell Harriman, was bestowed with the honor of being made a "Hero of the Soviet Union". Harriman got the top medal both from the Soviets, and the Nazis!

The bank Brown Brothers Harriman was a massive money laundering operation for the Nazis. JP Morgan organized and financed German cartels that propelled Hitler, etc. Unsurprisingly the same lords of finance are back to variations of their old tricks, as they allowed, if not incited, some governments to turn around all sorts of laws. Then, having violated the law, they trade on this, as the ultimate insiders! [Some of this occurred even in the last few weeks, so sure of impunity Goldman Sachs is. I say: write international warrants of arrest!]

So what is happening now, with the invention of financial derivatives, is that most of the world’s disposable capital is manipulated by financial sharks, so as to create fake revenues, to justify their bonuses and overall power wielding. There is therefore no more capital for the real economy (or, more exactly, increasingly insufficiently little).

Hence all financial products ought to be declared unlawful, until proven safe and effective. Financiers already are endowed with the regalian power of creating money (which government bestowed on them in the last 2 centuries, but which they did not have prior).

However, financiers know not enough to create a sustainable economy. Financiers are not engineers, just profiteers. And their search for profits has blinded them to their extravagant privilege, and even to how the universe works. Civilization is an exquisite mechanism, and so is an increasingly stressed biosphere. [This is not to be taken lightly: violating ecology and civilization simultaneously is how the immensely old Maya civilization self destructed, without any exterior input aside from a drought.]

None of this is new in principle. As James Madison, fourth president of the USA put it: "History records that the money changers have used every form of abuse, intrigue, deceit, and violent means possible to maintain their control over governments by controlling the money and its issuance."

This is not new, but we have just reached the breaking point, the point at which civilization and the biosphere are not sustainable anymore, from the activities of that obsolete particular financial system. It brought us Auschwitz, among other disasters. Left in power, it will bring up worse, soon.

There are other emotions than greed. Love, altruism, the passion for understanding, or for a job well done, can guide reason better than the obsession with having what one stole from others as they were looking somewhere else. It is time for reason to guide, and greed to be crushed. Otherwise there will be no world to call home, for anybody, whatsoever.

***

Annex and background: 1) FINANCIERS HAVE BEEN TELLING US WHAT MAN IS, AND THEY ARE WRONG. They have just been telling us about who they truly are. It’s all about them, not us.

Subjacent to economic theory is neuroeconomics. The hypothesis that the financiers and their political servants made, that profits ought to dominate social organization, was, fundamentally, a neurological hypothesis.

But greed belongs to the basic instinct of the Will To Power, whereas studying neurology belongs to the specifically human endeavor of establishing systems of thought. In other words, the neurologist is a new species, with a new kind of motivation, whereas the financier is an all together different species, animated by the sort of motivation we have seen in the last half a billion years, since there are social animals, and they crowd together, and need a unique leader, to have the single mind that allows them to stick together. This need, E Pluribus Unum, is the fundamental reason for the Will To Power, Nietzsche talked so much about. Will To Power is also the mechanism behind tyranny, oligarchy, and the domination of the Lords Of Finance.

Man is the species that went beyond Will To Power as the fundamental organizational principle of society. Being overlorded by finance is subhuman.

***

2) The "Nobel" Prize in Economics was given for some equation helping to price some financial call options. It surely will not be given for the simple mathematics alluded to above, which are much more drastic, but much more deserving, as they throw the entire existing financial system out of the window, as deserved for flaming material threatening to burn down the house of civilization.

***

3) Shacht (economics PhD, 1899) met with the American JP Morgan as early as 1905. Yes, JP Morgan, founder of the eponymous bank, whose present leader is much admired and befriended by Barack Obama (so he says).

Shacht, in charge of finances in imperial Germany occupied Belgium, was summarily dismissed, when his superior, general von Lumm, discovered that Schacht had diverted funds through his present and future employer, the bank (Dresdner), the sort of incest that passes for routine in present Washington.

After WWI Schacht came to lead the Reichsbank, the German central bank, and got to campaign against Germany paying war reparations, and helped set-up the Young and Dawes plans with Wall Street (which made Germany into Wall Street toy and profit generating center).

By 1926, besides supporting Wall Street, JP Morgan and various American banks’ operations, Shacht, the most important Lord of Finance in Germany, entangled with American financiers, through and through, was supporting the Nazis. Soon Schacht organized petitions by top personalities and plutocrats to persuade president Hindenburg to nominate Hitler Chancellor. Schacht’s financial career blossomed further under Hitler, as he headed the Reichsbank and the economy ministry (busy stealing Jews and other victims). He was to rise again after he got cleared of any wrongdoing in 1946.

Not to say that Shacht was thoroughly evil in appearance. He was not. Like Eichmann, his evil was rather “banal” (to use the concept from Hannah Arendt). Like Eichmann, Schacht pretended to keep on befriending Jews under the Nazis, and have empathy for them.

For a plutocratic servant, Schacht was rather personally pristine. But he efficiently pushed many extremely criminal ideas in his lifetime, and thus he was an ideal instrument for the plutocrats. Such people are legions. Instead of attacking them one by one, day by day, emotion by emotion, and anti-idea by anti-idea, it is more productive to attack the system of thought that gave rise to them.

And, as it is, the criminal system of thought is the regalian fractional reserve banking system, which allows private, unrepresentative, unelected, unsupervised money men, the bankers, to create most of the money, and distribute it to whoever they want, to do whatever they please.

Indeed, contrarily to what most people believe, although the state makes physical bank notes and coins, it’s the big private bankers who create most of the money, and, aggravating factor, do it through debt. That system was created, because it is very profitable to those, the plutocrats, who selected the politician-servants who defend and further their interests. That it went on for about two centuries in some parts (Britain) does not mean it is sustainable. Rome switched to a system biased towards plutocracy in 300 BCE, but lost its republic about 255 years later.

***

The question of how to have a currency, and how to make money to use in the USA, was a central question from 1791 (when up to an amazing 50 currencies were used inside the USA) until the “greenbacks” of the Secession War. Two attempts were made at making a “Bank of the USA”. The second such bank helped create a huge bubble in land and agriculture, to feed Europe, and displace its agriculture, after the old continent had been devastated by the Napoleonic wars (this to say that speculative bubbles can serve imperialism well). Because the “Bank of the USA” got accused of corruption and undue influence of European financiers, it was allowed to expire under president Jackson....

GREED, REAGAN’S ENGINE, LEADS WHERE HUMANKIND CANNOT GO:

Greed is called the "profit motive", in the present USA, and now, undeterred by the weak and scared Obama, the private health, military and banking industries of the USA are running away with greed, pushing around the naĂŻve and overwhelmed young president.

Some health insurance jumped by 39% (now delayed by weeks, to Obama’s naĂŻve satisfaction), and the number of American soldiers killed in Afghanistan tripled in the first year of Obama’s naivety, now having passed 1,000. The military budget of the USA, also augmented enormously, bigger than the rest of the world combined, has jumped up, in a country with 10% deficit. And bankers own the place, now that all taxpayer money, and more (borrowed from China), was sent to them to lose again.

Greed is another bad emotional ultrafilter, and it is related to nationalism and superstition. Greed basically asserts that having power on others is the emotion that matters most. In a sense greed stands above nationalism and superstition, because it is conducive to them both....

Capitalism has to grow up and become less greedy, relying less on a blind faith in "the invisible hand" and more on an understanding of human nature, including insights from the field of behavioral economics.

It must include sophisticated checks and balances to make sure that thesystem is not gamed, instead of childish ideas about the "inherent stability" of the market.

And it must make sure that the poker game doesn't suddenly end when one of the players gets all of the chips.

Of course, with high-frequency trading dominating the market (and see this), frontrunning, permanent bailouts (and see this), government-sponsored credit rating scams and enterprises, the creation and maintenance by the government of banks so big that their very size warps the entire system, socialism for the big boys, and all of the other shenanigans going on, we don't currently have free market capitalism.